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I. Introduction
Despite being the focus of a number of international instruments and bodies, disappearances remain a critical human
rights issue. Disappearances, and if and how they are addressed, significantly impact post-conflict reconstruction and
rebuilding efforts and shape perceptions of state commitment to the rule of law. The European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) Varnava judgment is a significant elaboration of the legal principles under the European Convention
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Convention)' on disappearances stemming from armed conflict.
The Varnava judgment is particularly instructive on the balance of competing tensions-the unique aspects of
disappearances; failure to investigate as a continuous violation; and applicants' obligation under the Convention
to exhaust domestic remedies and timely petition the ECtHR. The Court's discussion of temporal jurisdiction,
which includes cases from the Human Rights Committee, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and prior
Convention jurisprudence, is also notable.
Since its inception in 1980, the United Nation's Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances has
dealt with more than 50,000 disappearances involving eighty countries.2 Disappearances occur in any number of
settings and circumstances, the most challenging, both for the relatives' quest for information on the missing and
for states responsible for investigating the disappearances, being an ongoing conflict. This setting-Turkish military
operations in northern Cyprus in the summer of 1974-serves as the backdrop for Varnava.
II. European Court's Analysis in Varnava
Varnava is the latest in a series of ECtHR cases to consider various aspects of the Cyprus-Turkey conflict, including
the problem of refugees and individuals missing during and since the military operations, and the continuing
division of Cyprus which followed the 1974 invasion. The cases include both inter-state complaints 3 involving
the Governments of Turkey and Cyprus, as well as individual applications against both states.4 The Varnava
applicants, Greek-Cypriot relatives of nine men who went missing during various military engagements with the
Turkish Army in July and August 1974, brought the case against the government of Turkey, alleging that the
continuing disappearance of their loved ones was in violation of the Convention.
By sixteen votes to one, the ECtHR held that Turkey committed a series of continuing violations of the Convention
by failing to investigate the fate of the missing men. However, four concurring opinions, variously joined by a
total of five judges, reflect that while the Court agreed on the outcome, agreement on the analytical path to that
outcome remained elusive. The Court ordered Turkey to pay the applicants EUR 12,000 in non-pecuniary damages
and EUR 8,000 in costs and expenses.
The tension between the unique nature of disappearances and applicant due diligence obligations was amplified
and complicated by issues of legal interest, temporal jurisdiction, the underlying armed conflict, and the role, or
lack thereof, of the United Nations Committee on Missing Persons (CMP), which was established in 1981 to look
into cases of persons reported missing as a result of the 1974 conflict in Cyprus. The bulk of the Varnava judgment
is devoted to considering the temporal jurisdiction question of whether and how Turkey could violate the Convention
by failing to investigate the status of men who went missing in 1974 when Turkey did not accept the right of
individual petition until 1987. The answer, asserted by the applicants and accepted by the Court, stems from the
continuing obligations which flow from the "distinct phenomenon" of disappearances.
The continuing nature of disappearances, coupled with the ongoing but ineffectual efforts by the CMP, made the
subsequent inquiry into whether the applicants had exhausted other remedies and timely filed that much more
difficult. As a regional human rights body, the Court faced the awkward issue of identifying the point at which
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it should have been apparent to the applicants that the CMP "no longer offered any realistic hope of progress in
either finding bodies or accounting for the fate of their relatives in the near future." Faced with the daunting task
of identifying the point of futility, the Court's answer could not avoid an element of arbitrariness, which results
in uncertainty, as to the end point of the six month rule5 and the corresponding deadline for applicants to file their
petitions.
Whether that uncertainty applies to a broader range of disappearance cases or, as more likely, only those with the
unique factual predicate of Varnava, bears watching. The more detailed aspects of the procedural and jurisdictional
discussion in Varnava may prove one of the more significant contributions of the judgment, providing insight into
how the Court may balance the continuing nature of the violation caused by disappearances against the Court's
admissibility criteria in future cases. But that significance is somewhat undermined by Judge Ineta Ziemele, who,
in a concurring opinion separately joined by two other judges, claimed that the Court's reasoning on the six month
rule followed "a false route." Judge Ziemele, citing to the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts, viewed the Court's reliance on CMP failings as misplaced,
especially when linked to the six month rule. She contended that in cases of continual violations, and especially
disappearances, the Court should follow its own case law and not apply the six month rule in order to help prevent
the perpetrators from enjoying impunity. As a result, future individual applicants in disappearance cases may draw
support from the concurring opinion that the six month rule does not apply at all, while future respondent
governments will look to the judgment for the proposition that the rule's limitation applies, albeit imprecisely.
Of the forty pages of the base opinion, only seven are focused on the merits of the substantive violations of the
Convention. Here Varnava's legacy may be more what it did not say or consider than what it did. The Court
acknowledged the existence of an international conflict in 1974 in Cyprus, and that the Convention must be
interpreted in light of the relevant international humanitarian law, but provides little of that interpretation. In his
concurring opinion, Judge Ziemele cautioned that aspects of the judgment may "give a wrong idea of the Court's
approach regarding long-term enforced disappearances typically associated with complex international conflicts."
The Court in Varnava employed the logical approach developed in disappearance cases from Chechnya, which
provides much of the ECtHR case law on conflict related disappearances. Under that approach, where individuals
entered a place under the exclusive control of the authorities of a state and have not been seen since, the onus
shifts to that state to provide an explanation of what happened. That approach may be problematic as it requires,
and possibly assumes, effective control by a state when the very existence of conflict suggests otherwise. Moreover,
as one judge noted, Varnava differs from the Chechnya cases in that in the latter cases the presumed death fell
within the Court's temporal jurisdiction, and there was generally more recent evidence as to the underlying
disappearance.
Finally, the Varnava judgment described how even if death of individuals missing for decades were presumed,
the failure to conduct an investigation would still be regarded as a continuing violation of the Convention. Yet
the Court ordered only damages, which led to an interesting discussion in two of the concurring opinions, which
a total of four judges joined, of whether the Court could and should have explicitly stated that Turkey should
conduct an effective investigation.
III. . Conclusion
Ultimately, it seems likely that both future applicants and future respondent governments will rely on the varying
and at times competing rationales underpinning the Varnava judgment to advance their respective causes in future
disappearance cases before the ECtHR.
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In the case of Varnava and Others v. Turkey,

















Goniil Er6nen, ad hoc judge,
and Erik Fribergh, Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 19 November 2008 and 8 July 2009,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in nine applications (nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90,
16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the European Commission of
Human Rights ("the Commission") under former Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") by eighteen Cypriot nationals, Andreas and Giorghoulla Varnava
(no. 16064/90), Andreas and Loizos Loizides t (no. 16065/90), Philippos Constantinou and Demetris K. Peyiotis
(no. 16066/90), Demetris Theocharides and Elli Theocharidou 2 (no. 16068/90), Panicos and Chrysoula Charalam-
bous (no. 16069/90), Eleftherios and Christos Thoma (no. 16070/90)3, Savvas and Androula Hadjipanteli (no.
16071/90), Savvas and Georghios Apostolides (no. 16072/90) and Leontis Demetriou and Yianoulla Leonti Sarma
* This text was reproduced and reformatted from the text available at the European Court of Human Rights website
(visited March 29, 2010) http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=varnava&sessionid=
53802193&skin=hudoc-en.
(no. 16073/90) on 25 January 1990. Each of the nine applications contained authorities signed by the second
applicants in their own names and on behalf of their nine missing relatives named as the first applicants.
2. The applicants were represented by Mr A. Demetriades and Dr Kypros Chrystomides, respectively, lawyers
practising in Nicosia. The Turkish Government ("the respondent Government") were represented by their Agent.
3. The applicants alleged that the first applicants in the above applications had disappeared after being detained
by Turkish military forces from 1974 and that the Turkish authorities had not accounted for them since. They
invoked Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 13 and 14 of the Convention.
4. The applications were joined by the Commission on 2 July 1991 and declared admissible on 14 April 1998.
They were transmitted to the Court on 1 November 1999 in accordance with Article 5 § 3, second sentence, of
Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, the Commission not having completed its examination of the case by that date.
5. The applications were allocated to the Fourth Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court).
Within that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of the Convention) was constituted
as provided in Rule 26 § 1. Mr Tiirmen, the judge elected in respect of Turkey, withdrew from sitting in the case
(Rule 28). The Government accordingly appointed Ms G. Eronen to sit as an ad hoc judge in his place (Article
27 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 29 § 1).
6. The applicants and the Government each filed observations on the merits (Rule 59 § 1).
7. On 17 February 2000 the Cypriot Government informed the Court that they wished to participate in the
proceedings. They submitted observations on the merits (Rule 59 § 1).
8. On 1 November 2003 the Court changed the composition of its Sections (Rule 25 § 1). This case was
assigned to the newly composed Third Section (Rule 52 § 1).
9. On 17 February 2005, the applicants' representative informed the Court that the second applicant, Christos
Thoma, father of the first applicant in application no. 16070/90, had died on 12 April 1997 and enclosed letters
of authority from his wife, Chrystalleni Thoma, and his daughter, Maria Chrystalleni Thoma who stated their
intention of continuing the application.
10. On 13 November 2006, the applicants' representative informed the Court that the second applicant, Elli
Theocharidou, mother of the first-named applicant in application no. 16068/90, had died on 1 April 2005 and that
his heirs (Ourania Symeou, Kaiti Constantinou, Yiannoulla Kari, Eleni Papayianni, Andreas G. Theocharides,
Dimitris G. Theocharides and Marios G. Theocharides) wished to continue the application. On the same date, it
was communicated that the second applicant, Georghios Apostolides, father of the first applicant in application
no. 16072/90 had died on 14 April 1998 and that his heirs (Panayiota Chrysou, Chrystalla Antoniadou, Aggela
Georgiou, Avgi Nicolaou and Kostas Apostolides) intended to continue the application.
11. On 11 January 2007, the applicants' representative informed the Court that the second applicant, Loizos
Loizides, father of the first-named applicant in application no. 16065/90 had died on 14 September 2001 and that
his granddaughter, Athina Hava, intended to continue with the application on behalf of all the heirs of the deceased
(Markos Loizou, Despo Demetriou, Anna-Maria Loizou, Elena Loizidou and Loizos Loizides).
12. The Chamber decided, after consulting the parties, that no hearing on the merits was required (Rule 59 § 3
in fine). It found that the heirs of the deceased applicants had the requisite interest and standing to continue the
applications. In its judgment of 10 January 2008 ("the Chamber judgment"), the Chamber held unanimously that
there had been violations of Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the Convention and that no separate issues arose under Articles
4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 13 and 14 of the Convention. It also held that the finding of a violation constituted in itself sufficient
just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicants.
13. On 28 March 2008 the Government requested that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber (Article 43
of the Convention).
14. On 7 July 2008 a panel of the Grand Chamber decided to accept the request for a referral (Rule 73).
15. The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to the provisions of Article 27 §§ 2
and 3 of the Convention and Rule 24.
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16. On 11 August 2008, the Cypriot Government ("the intervening Government") informed the Court that
they wished to participate in the proceedings. They submitted observations on the merits (Rule 59 § 1).
17. On 18 September 2008, the President granted leave to Redress, an international non-governmental organisa-
tion, to submit written observations, which were received on 2 October 2008 (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention
and Rule 44 § 2).
18. The applicants, the Government and the intervening Government each filed a memorial.
19. A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 19 November 2008 (Rule
59 § 3).
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the respondent Government
Mr z. NECATIGIL, Agent,




MRS A. OZDEMIR, Advisers;
(b) for the applicants
Mr A. DEMETRIADES, Barrister,
Mr L. CHRISTODOULOU, Advocate,
Mr IAN BROWNLIE QC, Counsel,
Mr L. ARAKELIAN,
MR C. PARASKEVA, Advisers;
(c) for the intervening Government
Mr P. CLERIDES, Attorney-General, Agent,
Mr A.V.R. LOWE, Barrister at Law, and Professor of Law,
Mrs F. HAMPSON, Barrister at Law, and Professor of Law,
Mrs s. M. JOANNIDES, Barrister at Law, Advisers.
The Court heard addresses by Mr Brownlie and Mr Demetriades for the applicants, by Mr Frowein for the
Government and by Mr Lowe for the intervening Government.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
A. General context
20. The complaints raised in this application arise out of the Turkish military operations in northern Cyprus
in July and August 1974 and the continuing division of the territory of Cyprus. These events gave rise to four
applications by the Government of Cyprus against the respondent State, which have led to various findings of
violations of the Convention. The history is set out in the Court's judgment in Cyprus v. Turkey ([GC], no.
25781/94, §§ 13-18, ECHR 2001-IV; hereinafter "the fourth inter-State case") and the Court sees no reason for
repetition.
B. The facts of these cases
21. The facts are disputed by the parties. The Court notes that the summary of their versions of events given
in the Chamber judgment have not been; these are in large part reproduced below, with the addition of some new
information submitted by the parties and identified as such in the text.
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1. The applicants' submissions on the facts
a. Application no. 16064/90: Andreas Varnava
22. The first applicant, an ironmonger, was born in 1947; he has been considered missing since 1974. His wife,
the second applicant, was born in 1949 and resided in Lymbia.
23. In July 1974 the first applicant, responding to the declared general mobilisation, enlisted as a reservist in
the 305 Reservists Battalion which had its headquarters in Dhali village. On 8-9 August 1974 the reserve soldiers
of the 305 Reservists Battalion, among them the applicant, took up the manning of Cypriot outposts along the
front line opposite the Turkish military forces which extended between Mia Milia and Koutsovendis.
24. On the morning of 14 August 1974, Turkish military forces, supported by tanks and air cover, launched
an attack against the Cypriot area where the applicant and his battalion were serving. The Cypriot line of defence
was broken through and the Turkish military forces began advancing towards the area of Mia Milia; the Cypriot
forces began retreating and dispersed in all directions. After a while the area was captured by the Turkish military
forces and the applicant was cut off in it. Trace of the applicant was lost.
25. Mr Christakis loannou of Pano Dhikomo and now of Stavros Refugee Camp Strovolos, who had been a
prisoner of the Turkish military forces and/or Turkish authorities, stated that at Adana prison in Turkey, where
he had been taken on 31 August 1974, there were another 40 persons in the same room for 3-4 days. Among
them was the applicant. After the said period they were split up and he had not seen the applicant since.
b. Application no. 16065/90: Andreas Loizides
26. The first applicant, a student, was born in 1954; he has been considered missing since 1974. His father,
the second applicant, was born in 1907 and resided in Nicosia.
27. In July 1974 the first applicant was serving as a second lieutenant in the 1st Company of the 256 Infantry
Battalion stationed at Xeros. On about 30 July 1974 the battalion moved up to the Lapithos area. The soldiers
were split up into various groups; the applicant's group, consisting of ten men, was ordered to take up positions
on the Lapithos heights.
28. On 5 August 1974 Turkish forces launched a strong attack from all sides against the Cypriot forces' positions
while other Turkish troops managed to encircle Lapithos. Due to Turkish superiority in manpower and armour
the Cypriot forces were ordered to retreat towards the centre of the village where the company base was. The
applicant arrived there with his men and was informed by the inhabitants that Lapithos was surrounded by Turkish
troops. They hid their weapons in an orchard and put on civilian clothes. The same afternoon the applicant and
others attempted unsuccessfully to break through the Turkish lines. They than returned to Lapithos again where
they spent the night. At about 9.00 a.m. on 6 August 1974 Turkish troops entered Lapithos and started extensive
searches from house to house. The applicant and his comrades were warned by the villagers and they dispersed
in order to avoid capture. Since then none of the members of the group has seen the applicant again.
29. Nicos Th. Tampas of the 256 Infantry Battalion also on the Lapithos heights on 5 August 1974 mentioned
in a statement that at approximately 9.00 p.m. on 6 August 1974, he entered a warehouse in the village where he
found the applicant looking after a wounded man. After talking with the applicant, he went away. That was the
last time that he saw the applicant. He was himself arrested by the Turks on 9 August 1974 in Lapithos, detained
in various prisons in Cyprus and Turkey and released on 22 October 1974.
30. Christodoulos Panyi of Vatyli, now of Strovolos, in his statement declared that while he was a prisoner in
the Adana prison he saw and recognised the applicant, whom he had known earlier.
c. Application no. 16066/90: Philipos Constantinos
31. The first applicant, a student, was born in 1954; he has been considered missing since 1974. His father,
the second applicant, was born in 1929 and resided in Nicosia.
32. In July 1973 the first applicant enlisted to do his national service. He was posted to the 70 Engineers
Battalion. On 5 August 1974, a section of the battalion, including the applicant, was sent on a mission in the
364 [VOL. 49:
VARNAVA AND OTHERS v. TURKEY (EUR. CT. H.R.)
Lapithos and Karavas area (Kyrenia district). The men spent the night at Lapithos and intended to complete the
mission the following morning.
33. At about 4.30 a.m. on 6 August 1974, the Turkish Army launched a full-scale attack from all sides in the
Karavas and Lapithos area. The applicant's group leader ordered his men to split up into three groups and to
withdraw towards Vasilia (also Kyrenia district). The applicant was in one of the groups which intended to withdraw
following a route along the coast.
34. The men first reached the main Nicosia-Kyrenia road near the "Airkotissa" restaurant. While resting, they
heard shouting and the group leader sent the applicant and another soldier to investigate. As they had not returned
after about 15 minutes the remainder of the group left for Panagra (also in the Kyrenia district). On their way
there, they were ambushed by Turkish soldiers and the remaining group dispersed.
35. Costas A. Sophocleous, of Nicosia, stated that, when he was a prisoner in Turkey from 30 July until 28
October 1974, he met the applicant. They were together in the same prison in Turkey and were subsequently
transferred to Cyprus, whereupon he had been released but not the applicant.
36. Alexandros Papamichael, of Limassol, stated that he recognised the first applicant from a photograph that
was shown him by the second applicant and he had been with him in prison in Adana.
37. Finally, the second applicant mentioned in a signed statement that he identified his missing son in a
photograph published in "Athinaiki", a Greek newspaper, on 28 September 1974. In this photograph Greek-
Cypriot prisoners were shown on a boat en route to Turkey.
d. Application no. 16068/90: Demetris Theocharides
38. The first applicant, a photographer, was born in 1953; he has been considered missing since 1974. His
mother, the second applicant, was born in 1914 and resided in Nicosia.
39. On 20 July 1974 the first applicant enlisted as a reservist. He was posted to the 1st Company of the 301
Infantry Battalion. On 22 July the whole battalion was ordered to move on the following day to the area of Ayios
Ermolaos. The 1st Company took up defensive positions at a height called "Kalambaki", near the Turkish Cypriot
village of Pileri.
40. At about 4.30 a.m. on 26 July 1974 the 1st Company came under attack from the Turkish Cypriot villages
of Krini-Pileri. The Turkish military forces consisted of a paratroop battalion, twenty tanks and high-angle guns.
They succeeded in breaking through the Cypriot lines and infiltrated the right flank of the 1st Company in order
to encircle it. The commander ordered the company to regroup at the village of Sysklepos; from there they were
ordered to regroup at Kontemenos where they arrived at about 3.00 p.m. After a roll-call they found out that six
soldiers of the 1st Company were absent, including the applicant. The area in which the 1st Company had been
initially stationed was captured by the Turkish military forces.
41. Mr Nicos Nicolaou of Strovolos, who was a prisoner at Adana prison (Turkey) in September 1974, stated
that one day he heard a Turk calling the applicant's name. He also saw the applicant whom he happened to know
previously and noticed that he was lame in one leg. On 11 September 1974 Mr Nicolaou was taken to Antiyiama
prison (Turkey) and he had not seen the applicant since.
e. Application no. 16069/90: Panicos Charalambous
42. The first applicant, a student, was born in 1955; he has been considered missing since 1974. His mother,
the second applicant, was born in 1935 and resided in Limassol.
43. In 1972 the first applicant enlisted in the National Guard to do his military service.
44. On 23 July 1974 the applicant's father was informed by Andreas Komodromos that the applicant had left
Synchari with the men of the Headquarters Company and had gone to Aglandjia.
45. On 24 July 1974 Nikiforos Kominis with 17 soldiers, including the applicant, set out from Aglandjia in
two vehicles to reconnoitre the ground of the Koutsoventis-Vounos area. Three buses were seen driving along a
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street from the direction of Vounos village. An officer by the name of Votas ordered three or four soldiers to
search the buses. The buses were full of Turkish soldiers who started firing at the Greek-Cypriot men. The applicant
was wounded in the right hand and on the left side of his ribs. Mr. Andreas Komodromos cleaned his wounds
with water, loaded his gun and told him to go back. After that the applicant was not seen again by his unit.
46. According to the statement of Yiannis Melissis, who had been a prisoner of the Turks at Adana and Amasia
in September 1974, he happened to meet the applicant during his captivity. They both stayed with others in Cell
No. 9 until 18 September. They had chatted together every day and became friends. On 18 September Yiannis
Melissis was brought back to Cyprus and was released on 21 September 1974. The applicant had given him a
letter to pass on to his father but he left it in his pocket when he changed his clothes. All the clothes belonging
to the prisoners were burned.
47. The second applicant in her statement mentioned that she had recognised her son in a photograph that was
published in the Greek newspaper "Athinaiki" on 28 September 1974 and showed Cypriot prisoners transported
to Turkey on a Turkish destroyer in July 1974.
f. Application no. 16070/90: Eleftherios Thoma
48. The first applicant, a car mechanic, was born in 1951; he has been considered missing since 1974. His
father, the second applicant, was born in 1921 and resided in Strovolos.
49. In July 1974, in response to the general mobilisation, the first applicant enlisted as a reserve sergeant in
the Headquarters Company of the 251 Infantry Battalion.
50. On 20 July 1974, all the men of the Headquarters Company, including the applicant, were trying to prevent
the Turkish landing which was taking place in the area of "Pikro Nero", Kyrenia. At around 12 noon on 21 July
the Turkish military forces which had landed, supported by tanks and air cover, attacked the Cypriot forces that
were defending the area. Owing to the superiority of the Turkish military forces in men and weapons the 251
Infantry Battalion was ordered to retreat towards Trimithi village. The applicant was present during the regrouping
of the battalion. Two hours after the regrouping the commander of the battalion led his men out of Trimithi village,
reaching a ravine between the villages of Ayios Georghios and Templos where they took up battle positions. A
number of commandos of the 33rd Battalion arrived in the same ravine. At around 3.00 p.m. on 22 July 1974,
Turkish military forces surrounded the Cypriot forces in the ravine and opened fire. The commander ordered a
counter-attack intending to break through the Turkish military forces' lines and retreat towards Kyrenia. During
the counter-attack and retreat the trace of the applicant was lost.
51. On 4 September 1974 the "Special News Bulletin" - a daily communication by the Turkish Cypriot
administration -published a photograph of Greek-Cypriot prisoners-of-war under the caption "Greek-Cypriot
prisoners-of-war having their lunch. Yesterday they were visited by a representative of the Turkish Red Crescent."
In that photograph the first applicant was identified by the second applicant.
52. A former prisoner, Mr. Efstathios Selefcou, of Elio, now at Eylenja, in a signed statement to the Cypriot
Police said that during his transportation from Cyprus to Turkey he saw and talked to the first applicant, whom
he knew very well since they had been together at secondary school.
g. Application no. 16071/90: Savvas Hadjipanteli
53. The first applicant, a bank employee, was born in 1938 and lived at Yialousa; he had -been considered
missing since 1974. His wife, the second applicant, was born in 1938 and resided in Nicosia.
54. On 18 August 1974 about three or four saloon cars, a bus and two tanks, all full of Turkish and Turkish
Cypriot soldiers, turned up at Yialousa and stopped near the police station. The soldiers got out and ordered
everyone to assemble at the nearby coffee-house. About 35 persons gathered there. A Turkish officer told them
that from that time they would be under Turkish administration and ordered them to make a census of the Greek
Cypriot inhabitants of the village from the age of 7 to 70 and that he would be back on the following day to
collect the lists. On the following day, the same civilian and military vehicles (tanks) returned. A number of Turks
got out, marched to the coffee-house and asked for the lists. Another group of Turkish soldiers were carrying out
a house-to-house search. They imposed a curfew and, having taken the lists, they took with them for questioning
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nine persons, including the first applicant. They put them on a bus and drove them outside the village in the
direction of Famagusta.
55. On the same day, Yialousa was visited by United Nations men to whom the arrest of the nine Greek
Cypriots was reported by their co-villagers.
56. According to the applicants, representatives of the International Red Cross in Cyprus visited Pavlides Garage
in the Turkish-occupied sector of Nicosia and on 28 August 1974 recorded the names of 20 Greek Cypriots held
there, including the nine persons from Yialousa (they cited document EZY284D).4 Costas M. Kaniou, Sofronios
Mantis and loannis D. Constantis also saw the said detainees at the Pavlides Garage, during the same period that
they were detained there; they were released later.
57. On 27 August 1974 a group of Turkish Cypriot civilians came to Yialousa looking for Pentelis Pantelides,
Loizos Pallaris, Michael Sergides and Christakis Panayides. Having found them, they led them to the Savings
Bank. After having emptied two safes they ordered that the third one should be opened, but they were told that
the keys were with the applicant. Subsequently they left, having shut and sealed the outside door. After 10-12
days the same group looked for the same persons and went again to the bank building. They had the two keys
for the safe which the applicant always carried with him. Loizos Pallaris opened the safe. The keys were in a
leather case which the applicant had used to carry, but his personal keys were not included. The Turkish Cypriots
took the contents of the safe, sealed the gate and left.
h. Application no. 16072/90: Savvas Apostolides
58. The first applicant, a moulder, was born in 1955; he has been considered missing since 1974. His father,
the second applicant, was born in 1928 and resided in Strovolos.
59. In 1974 the first applicant was doing his national service in the 70 Engineers Battalion stationed in Nicosia.
On 5 August 1974 a section of the battalion, including the applicant, was sent on a mission in the Karavas and
Lapithos area. The men spent the night at Lapithos and intended to complete their mission the following morning.
At about 4.30 a.m. on 6 August 1974 the Turkish military forces launched a full-scale attack from all sides in the
area of Karavas and Lapithos. The commander ordered his men to split up into three groups, withdraw towards
Vasilia and meet there. On their way they were ambushed by the Turkish military forces and in the confusion
dispersed.
60. Later Mr Costas Themistocleous of Omorphita, now of Nicosia, who was taken as a prisoner to Adana
prison, saw there the applicant, whom he had known from childhood; this was on or about 17 October 1974, while
he was about to return to Cyprus. They did not speak to each other but waved.
i. Application no. 16073/90: Leontis Demetriou Sarma
61. The first applicant was born in 1947; he has been considered missing since 1974. His wife, the second
applicant, was born in 1949 and resided in Limassol.
62. On 20 July 1974, following the general mobilisation, the first applicant enlisted as a reservist in the 399
Infantry Battalion. He was put in the Support Company. On 22 July the battalion moved to the Mia Milia area
to reinforce the Greek Cypriot forces and to man outposts on the front line.
63. On the morning of 14 August 1974 Turkish military forces, supported by tanks and air cover, launched a
heavy attack against the Greek-Cypriot forces in the area, where the applicant was with his battalion. Owing to
the superiority of the Turkish military forces the Greek-Cypriot defence line was broken, the Turkish military
forces advanced towards the Mia Milia area, and the Greek Cypriot forces began to retreat. The area was, in a
short while, occupied by the Turkish military forces, the applicant was trapped within it. Trace of the applicant
was lost.
64. An ex-prisoner of war, Mr Costas Mena of Palaekythro, now at Koracou, stated that during his detention
at Antiyama, Turkey, he saw the applicant who was detained in cell-block No. 9. On 18 October 1974 all the
prisoners at Antiyama were taken to Adana. There they were all lined up in four rows. A Turkish military officer
picked out some of the prisoners, including the applicant, who were taken away. Mr Mena had not seen the
applicant since.
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2. The respondent Government's submissions on the facts
65. The respondent Government disputed that the applicants had been taken into captivity by the Turkish army
during the military action in Cyprus in 1974. They considered that the inevitable conclusion from the information
provided in the application forms was that all the alleged "missing persons," except for Savvas Hadjipanteli,
were military personnel who died in action in July-August 1974.
66. The Government noted that, since the introduction of these applications, files relating to the same "missing
persons" had been submitted by the Government of Cyprus to the United Nations Committee on Missing Persons
("CMP") in Cyprus during 1994 and 1995. In these files there were no assertions that these people had been
seen in any of the prisons in Turkey. The names of the alleged witnesses listed in application nos. 16064/90
(Christakis lannou), 16065/90 (Christodoulos Panayi), 16066/90 (Costa Sophocleous), 16068/90 (Nicos Nicolaou),
16069/90 (Yiannis Melissis), 16070/90 (Efstathios Selefcou), 16073/90 (Costas Themisthocleous) and 16073/90
(Costas Mena) were not cited in support. The alleged sightings were therefore without foundation.
67. As regards Savvas Hadjipanteli (no. 16071/90), who was a civilian, the Government noted that the Interna-
tional Red Cross ("ICRC") had visited the Pavlides Garage where he had allegedly been held but his name,
contrary to the applicants' assertion, did not appear in the list of Greek Cypriots held. In any event, it was a transit
centre where people were not held for more than a few days before being released or moved elsewhere. In the
file submitted to the CMP, there was only a reference to witnesses seeing the key case which he was alleged to
carry continually on his person. The materials of the ICRC, who paid regular visits to prisoners and internees in
Turkey, also showed that none of the alleged missing persons had been brought to Turkey or detained. All prisoners
that had been taken to Turkey were repatriated between 16 September 1974 and 28 October 1974 and lists of
those concerned had been handed over to the Greek-Cypriot authorities.
68. As concerned the alleged identification of the missing persons in photographs, the Government pointed out
that a scientific investigation of certain published photographs and documentary film had been carried out by
Professor Pierre A. Margot of the Institute of Forensic Science and Criminology of the Law Faculty of the
University of Lausanne at the request of the Third Member of the CMP. This had shown that it was extremely
dubious that anyone could be identified from these documents and that any alleged identification by relatives was
unreliable given the quality of the material and their emotional feelings.
3. The submissions of the intervening Government
69. The Government of Cyprus submitted that the first applicants went missing in areas under the control of
the Turkish forces.
a. Varnava, no. 16064/90, and Sarma, no. 16073/90
70. These two applicants had been brought with their units to the area of Mia Milia to man Cypriot outposts
along the front line. On 14 August Turkish armed forces launched the attack which gained them control over the
whole of northern and eastern Cyprus by 16 August. When the Turkish forces broke through the Cypriot line of
defence and advanced on Mia Milia, the Cypriot forces retreated and dispersed in all directions. The Turkish
forces rapidly gained control of the entire surrounding area. Many Greek Cypriot soldiers, including the two
applicants, were cut off and completely surrounded. They could not have escaped as the intervening Government
would have known of their fate.
b. Loizides, no. 16065/90
71. This applicant was in charge of soldiers amongst those defending Lapithos. After the Turkish forces encircled
Lapithos, the Greek-Cypriot forces were ordered to retreat. The applicant's group put on civilian clothing and
unsuccessfully tried to break out of the village. When the Turkish forces entered the village next morning, the
applicant's group dispersed to avoid capture. At about 9.00 p.m. on 6 August, the applicant was seen by Nicos
Th. Tampas in a warehouse tending a soldier injured in the head. Tampas was later captured and detained. His
was the last reported sighting of the first applicant. It was most likely that the first applicant had remained with
the injured man and was taken into detention by the Turkish forces who were in control of the entire area. Only
one man was known to have escaped from the village and he, unlike the first applicant, had local knowledge of
the terrain.
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c. Constantinou, no. 16066/90
72. Under attack from the Turkish army, the first applicant's unit was ordered to split into three groups and
withdraw westwards. The applicant's group reached the Nicosia-Kyrenia road, 200 metres from the Airkotissa
restaurant. The applicant and another man were sent to investigate shouting coming from the restaurant. After 15
minutes when they did not return, the group left for Panagra. At the time that the applicant and the other soldier
were sent to the restaurant, there were Turkish forces in the area. The most plausible explanation for the two men
not returning, in the absence of any sound of fighting or shooting, was that they had been detained, either to
prevent them giving away the Turkish positions, for information or as prisoners of war.
d. Theocharides, no. 16068/90
73. On 26 July 1974 the first applicant was discovered to be missing from his unit at roll call after they had
broken through encircling Turkish forces. The area in which his unit had been stationed was captured by Turkish.
forces. Whatever happened to the applicant afterwards occurred in an area controlled by the Turkish forces.
e. Charalambous, no. 16069/90
74. This applicant was seen wounded in his right hand and the left side of the ribs after a clash between Greek-
Cypriot forces and three buses full of Turkish soldiers coming from Vounos village. His wounds were cleaned
by a witness named Komodromos and he was told to make his way uphill with two other men, one of whom was
also injured, to the monastery where the Greek Cypriot forces were. The other two men were discovered dead
two days later when the Turkish forces withdrew. It was clear that the applicant had either been found dead by
the Turkish forces or, as was more likely, found and detained in an injured condition.
f. Thoma, no. 16070/90
75. This applicant was amongst those attempting to prevent the invasion of Kyrenia. Some individuals were
identified as killed in the operation; the applicant was not amongst them. The intervening Government had no
evidence that this applicant was dead. It had to be assumed that the applicant had been detained alive.
76. This was further corroborated by the photograph published in the "Special News Bulletin", issued daily
by the Turkish Cypriot administration, on 4 September, of Greek Cypriot prisoners-of-war having their lunch. The
first applicant was identified at the time by his father, the second applicant.
77. In their observations before the Grand Chamber, the intervening Government provided a copy of a statement
dated 31 July 1976 by Efstathios Selefcou taken by a police officer which stated that while being carried as a
prisoner on a ship from Cyprus to Turkey he had seen and spoken briefly to Eleftherios Thoma, whom he knew
from school. They also provided a copy of the ICRC Tracing Agency sheet (Ref. No. EZG 14023/2) according
to which Thoma had been sighted in a Turkish army hospital in Mintzeli in mid-October 1974. The intervening
Government explained that they had not provided this information to CMP as it had no mandate to investigate
outside the territory of Cyprus and a policy decision had been taken when submitting documents to the CMP on
7 June 1994 not to antagonise Turkey whose co-operation was necessary if the CMP was to begin effective
operation.
g. Hadjipanteli, no. 16071/90
78. By 16 August 1974 Turkish forces were in control of northern and eastern Cyprus including the Karpas
peninsula where the first applicant worked as general cashier in the Savings Bank in Yialousa. On 18 August
Turkish and Turkish Cypriot soldiers arrived in the village and a Turkish officer ordered a census of the Greek
Cypriots between 7 and 70 years of age. The next day, the lists were handed over and Turkish soldiers carried
out searches. They left, taking with them on a bus, nine individuals, including the first applicant. This was reported
by fellow villagers.
79. Turkish Cypriots came to the village in the circumstances reported by the applicants (see paragraphs 54-
57 above). They had the two keys for a safe which the first applicant had always carried with him. It was highly
probable that the Turkish Cypriots had obtained the keys by informing those holding the first applicant, showing
that he was alive and in detention for at least nine days. There was some evidence that he was detained after those
nine days, at least until 28 August, at the Pavlides garage.
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80. The list of persons seen by the ICRC detained at Pavlides garage on 28 August 1974 included the name
Savvis Kalli, which was the name under which this first applicant had been recorded (the first name being misspelled
and the surname of his father (Kallis), as appearing on the first applicant's identity card, also being misspelled).
81. An affidavit dated 6 November 2007 by Lakis N. Christolou, a lawyer in the firm representing the applicants
in this application, was submitted to the Grand Chamber. It stated that the son of the missing man, Mr Georgios
Hadjipanteli, recounted that at the end of 2005 he had met a Turkish Cypriot writer who had informed him that,
while investigating disappearances, she had discovered evidence indicating that the nine missing persons from
Yialousa had been buried near the Turkish Cypriot village of Galatia. When the son conveyed this information
to the CMP he was informed that the inhabitants of Galatia had already given information to the CMP about the
execution and burial of Greek Cypriot prisoners in the area of their village.
h. Apostolides, no. 16072/90
82. This first applicant withdrew with his section from Lapithos towards Vasilia. They were ambushed by
Turkish military forces and dispersed. There has been no news of the applicant since. The intervening Government
had no knowledge of the first applicant, which meant that he had not escaped. Nor was there any evidence that
he was killed in the ambush. It was overwhelmingly likely that he had been detained by the Turkish armed forces.
4. Recent developments
83. In 2007, in the context of the activity of the CMP (see below paragraphs 86-88) human remains were
exhumed from a mass grave near the Turkish Cypriot village of Galatia in the Karpas area. After anthropological
and genetic analyses, the remains of Savvas Hadjipanteli (named as first applicant in application no. 16071/90)
were identified, along with the remains of the other eight missing persons from Yialousa village and two other
missing Greek Cypriots. The bodies of the nine missing persons from Yialousa were lined up next to each other
in the grave, with two other bodies on top at a shallower depth. The forensic report dated 13 November 2007
detailed the process of exhumation and noted that it appeared to be a primary and synchronous burial site as the
condition of the bodies indicated that they were buried while soft tissue was still present and placed in direct
contact with each other. The main object of the analysis of the human remains was stated in the report to be their
identification.
84. Several bullets from firearms were found in the grave. The medical certificate for the cause of death signed
by a doctor on 12 July 2007 in regard to Savvas Hadjipanteli, indicated a bullet wound to the skull, a bullet wound
in the right arm and a wound on the right thigh. His family was notified and a religious funeral took place on 14
July 2007.
II. - RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE
A. The United Nations Committee on Missing Persons ("CMP")
1. Background
85. The CMP was formally set up in 1981. The following paragraphs are taken from the Commission's Report
in the fourth inter-state case (paragraphs 181-191):
"181. ...According to its terms of reference, it 'shall only look into cases of persons reported
missing in the intercommunal fighting as well as in the events of July 1974 and afterwards.' Its
tasks have been circumscribed as follows: 'to draw up comprehensive lists of missing persons of
both communities, specifying as appropriate whether they are alive or dead, and in the latter case
approximate time of the deaths.' It was further specified that 'the committee will not attempt to
attribute responsibility for the deaths of any missing persons or make findings as to the cause of
such deaths' and that 'no disinterment will take place under the aegis of this committee. The
committee may refer requests for disinterment to the ICRC for processing under its customary
procedures.' 'All parties concerned' are required to co-operate with the committee to ensure access
throughout the island for its investigative work. Nothing is provided as regards investigations in
mainland Turkey or concerning the Turkish armed forces in Cyprus.
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182. The CMP consists of three members, one 'humanitarian person' being appointed by the
Greek-Cypriot side and one by the Turkish-Cypriot side and the third member being an 'official
selected by the ICRC... with the agreement of both sides and appointed by the Secretary-General
of the United Nations'.
183. The CMP has no permanent chairman, the presidency rotating on a monthly basis between
all three members. Decisions are to be taken by consensus to the extent possible. According to
the procedural rules agreed upon in 1984, the procedure is to be conducted as follows:
'1. Individual or collective cases will be presented to the CMP with all possible information.
The CMP will refer each case to the side on whose territory the missing person disappeared;
this side will undertake a complete research and present to the CMP a written report. It is the
duty of the CMP members appointed by each side, or their assistants, to follow the enquiries
undertaken on the territory of their side; the third member and/or his assistants will be fully
admitted to participate in the enquiries.
2. The CMP will make case decisions on the basis of the elements furnished by both sides
and by the Central Tracing Agency of the ICRC: presumed alive, dead, disappeared without
visible or other traceable signs.
3. If the CMP is unable to reach a conclusion on the basis of the information presented, a
supplementary investigation will be undertaken at the request of a CMP member. The third
CMP member and/or his assistants will participate in each supplementary investigation, or, as
the case may be, investigators recruited by the CMP with the agreement of both sides.'
184. The 1984 rules state as 'guiding principles' that 'investigations will be conducted in the sole
interest of the families concerned and must therefore convince them. Every possible means will
be used to trace the fate of the missing persons.' The families of missing persons may address
communications to the committee which will be passed on to its appropriate member. That member
will eventually provide the family with 'final information as to the fate of a particular missing
person,' but no interim information must be given by any member of the committee to the family
of a missing person during the discussion of a particular case.
185. The committee's entire proceedings and findings are strictly confidential, but it can issue
public statements or reports without prejudice to this rule. According to the 1984 procedural rules,
a press release will be issued at the close of a meeting or series of meetings and occasional progress
reports will also be published. Individual members may make additional statements to the press
or the media, provided they comply with the rule of confidentiality, avoid criticism or contradiction
to the joint statement and any kind of propaganda.
186. Due to the strict confidentiality of the CMP's procedure, no detailed information about the
progress and results of its work is available. However, from the relevant sections of the regular
progress reports on the UN Operation in Cyprus submitted by the UN Secretary-General to the
Security Council it appears that the committee's work started in May 1984 with a limited, equal
number of cases on both sides (Doc. S/16596 of 1.6.1984, para. 51); that by 1986 an advanced
stage had been reached in the investigation of the initial 168 individual cases, supplementary
investigations being started in 40 cases in which reports had been submitted (Doc. S/18102/Add.
1, of 11 June 1986, para. 15); and that, while no difficulties were encountered as regards the
organisation of interviews or visits in the field, real difficulties then arose by the lapse of time
and, even more importantly, lack of cooperation by the witnesses.
187. This prompted the committee to issue a lengthy press release on 11 April 1990 (Doc. S/
21340/Annex). There the committee stated that it considered the co-operation of the witnesses as
absolutely fundamental, but that the witnesses were often reluctant, unwilling or unable to give
full information as to their knowledge about the disappearance of a missing person. However, the
committee could not compel a witness to talk. The explanation of the witnesses' reluctance to
testify was that they were afraid of incriminating themselves or others in disappearances, and this
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despite the witnesses being told by the committee that the information given would be kept strictly
confidential and being reassured that they would 'not be subject to any form of police or judicial
prosecution'. The committee appealed to the parties concerned to encourage the witnesses to give
the very fullest information in their knowledge. It further stated:
'In order to further allay the fears of the witnesses, the Committee, so as to give the strongest
guarantees to the witnesses, is examining measures that could be taken to ensure that they
would be immune from possible judicial and/or police proceedings solely in connection with
the issue of missing persons and for any statement, written or oral, made for the Committee
in the pursuit of activities within its mandate.'
188. In the same press release, the committee pointed out that it considered as legitimate the desire
of the families to obtain identifiable remains of missing persons. However, despite systematic
enquiries on burial places of missing persons, on both sides, it had not been successful in this
respect. It recalled that according to its terms of reference it could not itself order disinterments.
Moreover, while there was access to all evidence available, the committee had not reached the
stage of finding a common denominator for the appreciation of the value of this evidence. Finally,
the committee stated that it was considering the possibility of requesting that the two sides furnish
it with basic information concerning the files of all missing persons, so as to allow it to have a
global view of the whole problem.
189. In December 1990, the UN Secretary-General wrote a letter to the leaders of both sides
observing that so far the committee had been given details on only about 15 % of the cases and
urging them to submit all cases. He further emphasised the importance of reaching consensus on
the criteria that both sides would be ready to apply in their respective investigations. Moreover, the
committee should consider modalities for sharing with affected families any meaningful information
available (Doc. S/24050, of 31 May 1992, para. 38). On 4 October 1993, in a further letter to the
leaders of both communities the UN Secretary-General noted that no improvement had been made
and that the international community would not understand that the committee, nine years after
it had become operational, remained unable to function effectively. Only 210 cases had been
submitted by the Greek-Cypriot side and only 318 by the Turkish-Cypriot side. He again urged
both sides to submit all cases without further delay and the committee to reach a consensus on
the criteria for concluding its investigations (Doc. S/26777, of 22 November 1993, paras. 88 - 90).
190. On 17 May 1995 the UN Secretary-General, on the basis of a report of the CMP's third
member and proposals by both sides, put forward compromise proposals on criteria for concluding
the investigations (Doc. S/1995/488, of 15 June 1995, para. 47), which were subsequently accepted
by both sides (Doc. S/1995/1020, of 10 December 1995, para. 33). By December 1995, the Greek
Cypriot side submitted all their case files (1493). However, the committee's third member withdrew
in March 1996 and the UN Secretary-General made it a condition for appointing a new one that
certain outstanding questions, including classification of cases, sequence of investigations, priorities
and expeditious collection of information on cases without known witnesses, be settled beforehand
(Doc. S/1996/411, of 7 June 1996, para. 31). After being repeatedly urged to resolve these issues
(Doc. S/1997/437, of 5 June 1997, paras. 24 -25), both parties eventually came to an agreement
on 31 July 1997 on the exchange of information on the location of graves of missing persons and
return of their remains. They also requested the appointment of a new third member of the CMP
(Doc. S/1997/962, of 4 December 1997, paras. 21 and 29-31). However, by June 1998, no progress
had been made towards the implementation of this agreement. The UN Secretary-General noted
in this context that the Turkish-Cypriot side had claimed that victims of the coup d'etat against
Archbishop Makarios in 1974 were among the persons listed as missing and that this position
deviated from the agreement (Doc. S/1998/488, of 10 June 1998, paras. 23).
191. A new third member of the CMP had, by the time of the Commission's report, been appointed
(ibid. para. 24). The Committee has not completed its investigations and accordingly the families
of the missing persons have not been informed of the latter's fate."
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2. Exhumations and identification of remains
86. From August 2006 the CMP began a substantial exhumation project on identified burial sites with a view
to identifying the remains of bodies and ensuring their return to their families. A special unit to provide information
to families was also set up.
87. According to the information provided by the respondent Government, 430 sets of remains had been located;
275 remains had been submitted for analysis and identification by the anthropological laboratory; since June 2007
105 bodies had been identified (76 Greek Cypriots, 29 Turkish Cypriots); by 13 March 2008, 84 files of missing
persons had been closed; by the date of the hearing, 5% of missing persons had been identified and their remains
returned to their relatives for burial; by 10 September 2008, 180 sites had been visited by bi-communal teams
(155 in the north, 25 in the south)..
3. The Council of Europe Committee of Ministers' decision of 23 March 2009
88. In the ongoing monitoring process concerning Cyprus v. Turkey ([GC], no. 25781/94, ECHR 2001-IV),
the Committee of Ministers looked at the question of missing persons and inter alia:
"2. considered that it was crucial that the current work of the CMP be carried out under the best
possible conditions and without delay;
3. in consequence, while reaffirming that the execution of the judgment requires effective investiga-
tions, notes that these should not jeopardise the CMP's mission;
4. considered that the sequence of measures to be taken within the framework of the effective
investigations, and carrying out of the work of the CMP should take into consideration these two
essential aims;
5. underlined in any event the urgent need for Turkish authorities to take concrete measures having
in mind the effective investigations required by the judgment, in particular relating to the CMP's
access to all relevant information and places;
6. in that context, underlined, moreover the importance of preserving all the information obtained
during the Programme of Exhumation and Identification carried out by the CMP; ... "
B. International law documents on enforced disappearances
1. United Nations Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance
(1/Res /47/133, 18 December 1992)
89. This provides inter alia:
"Article 1
1. An act of enforced disappearance is an offence to human dignity. It is condemned as a denial
of the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and as a grave and flagrant violation of the
human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and reaffirmed and developed in international instruments in this field.
2. Any act of enforced disappearance places the persons subjected thereto outside the protection
of the law and inflicts severe suffering on them and their families. It constitutes a violation of the
rules of international law guaranteeing, inter alia, the right to recognition as a person before the
law, the right to liberty and security of the person and the right no to be subjected to torture and
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. It also violates or constitutes a grave
threat to the right to life.
Article 2
1. No State shall practise, permit or tolerate enforced disappearances.
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2. States shall act at the national and regional levels and in co-operation with the United Nations
to contribute by all means to the prevention and eradication of enforced disappearance.
Article 3
Each State shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent
and terminate acts of enforced disappearance in any territory under its jurisdiction.
Article 17
1. Acts constituting enforced disappearance shall be considered a continuing offence as long as
the perpetrators continue to conceal the fate and the whereabouts of persons who have disappeared
and these facts remained unclarified.
2. When the remedies provided for in article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights are no longer effective, the statute of limitations relating to acts of enforced disappearance
shall be suspended until these remedies are re-established.
3. Statutes of limitations, where they exist, relating to acts of disappearance shall be substantial
and commensurate with the extreme seriousness of the offence.
Article 19
The victims of acts of enforced disappearance and their family shall obtain redress and shall have
the right to adequate compensation, including the means for as complete a rehabilitation as possible.
In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of enforced disappearance, their
dependents shall also be entitled to compensation."
90. The United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance have issued, inter alia, the
following General Comments on the above Declaration:
General Comment on article 17 of the Declaration (E/CN.4/2001/68/18 December 2000)
27. Article 17 establishes fundamental principles intended to clarify the nature of enforced disappear-
ances and their criminal consequences. The sense and general purpose of the article is to ensure
conditions such that those responsible for acts constituting enforced disappearance are brought to
justice within a restrictive approach to statutory limitations...
28. The definition of 'continuing offence' (para. 1) is of crucial importance for establishing the
responsibilities of the State authorities. Moreover, this article imposes very restrictive conditions.
The article is intended to prevent perpetrators of those criminal acts from taking advantage of
statutes of limitations...
General Comment on article 19 of the Declaration (5/CN.4/1998/43)
"72. Article 19 also explicitly mentions the right of victims and their family to 'adequate compensa-
tion'. States are, therefore, under an obligation to adopt legislative and other measures in order
to enable the victims to claim compensation before the courts or special administrative bodies
empowered to grant compensation. In addition to the victims who survived the disappearance,
their families are also entitled to compensation for the suffering during the time of disappearance
and in the event of the death of the victim, his or her dependants are entitled to compensation.
73. Compensation shall be 'adequate' i.e. proportionate to the gravity of the human rights violation
(e.g. the period of disappearance, the conditions of detention, etc.) and to the suffering of the
victim and the family. Monetary compensation shall be granted for any damage resulting from an
enforced disappearance such as physical or mental harm, lost opportunities, material damages and
loss of earnings, harm to reputation and costs required for legal or expert assistance. Civil claims
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for compensation shall not be limited by amnesty laws, made subject to statutes of limitation or
made dependent on penal sanctions imposed on the perpetrators.
74. The right to adequate compensation for acts of enforced disappearance under article 19 shall
be distinguished from the right to compensation for arbitrary executions. In other words, the right
of compensation in relation to an act of enforced disappearance shall not be made conditional on
the death of the victim. 'In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of enforced
disappearance,' the dependents are, however, entitled to additional compensation by virtue of the
last sentence of article 19. If the death of the victim cannot be established by means of exhumation
or similar forms of evidence, States have an obligation to provide for appropriate legal procedures
leading to the presumption of death or a similar legal status of the victim which entitles the
dependants to exercise their right to compensation. .. As a general principle, no victim of enforced
disappearance shall be presumed dead over the objections of the family."
2. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (2006)6
91. This provides inter alia:
"Article 1
1. No one shall be subjected to enforced disappearance.
2. No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal
political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification for enforced
disappearance.
Article 2
For the purposes of this Convention, 'enforced disappearance' is considered to be the arrest,
detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons
or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed
by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts
of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.
Article 3
Each State Party shall take appropriate measures to investigate acts defined in article 2 committed
by persons or groups of persons acting without the authorization, support or acquiescence of the
State and to bring those responsible to justice.
Article 4
Each State Party shall take the necessary measures to ensure that enforced disappearance constitutes
an offence under its criminal law.
Article 5
The widespread or systematic practice of enforced disappearance constitutes a crime against
humanity as defined in applicable international law and shall attract the consequences provided
for under such applicable international law.
Article 8
Without prejudice to article 5,
1. A State Party which applies a statute of limitations in respect of enforced disappearance shall
take the necessary measures to ensure that the term of limitation for criminal proceedings:
(a) Is of long duration and is proportionate to the extreme seriousness of this offence;
(b) Commences from the moment when the offence of enforced disappearance ceases, taking into
account its continuous nature.
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2. Each State Party shall guarantee the right of victims of enforced disappearance to an effective
remedy during the term of limitation."
3. Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons (1994)
92. This provides inter alia:
"Article I
The States Parties to this Convention undertake:
a. Not to practice, permit, or tolerate the forced disappearance of persons, even in states of
emergency or suspension of individual guarantees;
b. To punish within their jurisdictions, those persons who commit or attempt to commit the crime
of forced disappearance of persons and their accomplices and accessories;
c. To cooperate with one another in helping to prevent, punish, and eliminate the forced disappear-
ance of persons;
d. To take legislative, administrative, judicial, and any other measures necessary to comply with
the commitments undertaken in this Convention.
Article II
For the purposes of this Convention, forced disappearance is considered to be the act of depriving
a person or persons of his or their freedom, in whatever way, perpetrated by agents of the state
or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support, or acquiescence of the
state, followed by an absence of information or a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of
freedom or to give information on the whereabouts of that person, thereby impeding his or her
recourse to the applicable legal remedies and procedural guarantees.
Article III
The States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional procedures, the
legislative measures that may be needed to define the forced disappearance of persons as an offense
and to impose an appropriate punishment commensurate with its extreme gravity. This offense
shall be deemed continuous or permanent as long as the fate or whereabouts of the victim has not
been determined..."
C. Case-law concerning ratione temporis jurisdiction in disappearance cases before other interna-
tional bodies
1. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
93. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) has established that procedural obligations arise in
respect of killings and disappearances under several provisions of the American Convention on Human Rights
("the American Convention"). In many cases, in particular those where the substantive limb of Article 4 (right
to life) had not been breached, the IACHR has examined such procedural complaints autonomously under Article
8, which, unlike the Convention, guarantees the right to a fair trial for determination of rights and obligations of
any nature, and Article 25, which protects the right to judicial protection, taken together with Article 1 § 1
(obligation to respect rights). The IACHR has followed the latter approach in cases where the killing or disappearance
took place before the recognition of its jurisdiction by a respondent State.
94. In Blake v. Guatemala the IACHR had to deal with the ratione temporis exception raised by the Government,
since the disappearance itself had taken place before the critical date (acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction
in 1987). The court considered that forced disappearances implied the violation of various human rights and that
the effects of such infringements - even though some may have been completed - "may be prolonged continuously
or permanently until such time as the victim's fate or whereabouts are established" (Blake, 2 July 1996, Preliminary
Objections, § 39).
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95. Mr. Blake's fate or whereabouts were not known to his family until June 14, 1992, after the date on which
Guatemala accepted the jurisdiction of the Court. This led to the IACHR declaring itself competent ratione temporis
to examine the "effects and actions" subsequent to the critical date. However, it accepted the Government's
preliminary objection as regards the deprivation of Mr. Blake's liberty and his murder, which had been completed
before the critical date and could not be considered per se to be continuous.
96. In its judgment on the merits (24 January 1998, see p. 54), the IACHR considered the disappearance as
marking the beginning of a "continuing situation". It proceeded to examine the complaint under Article 8 in
relation to Article 1 § 1 and declared that Guatemala had violated the right of Mr. Blake's relatives to have his
disappearance and death effectively investigated, to have those responsible prosecuted and punished where appro-
priate, and to be compensated, notwithstanding the lack of temporal competence to deal with the substantive
complaints.
97. The IACHR came to a similar conclusion in cases of disappearances in which the victim's whereabouts
had never been established. In Serrano- Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador (judgment of 23 November 2004, Preliminary
Objections), the Court found that it had no competence to examine, under Articles 4, 5 and 7 (right to personal
liberty), the disappearances of the sisters as such, since they had allegedly taken place thirteen years before El
Salvador had accepted the contentious jurisdiction of the court. It came to the same conclusion as regards the
procedural violations invoked under Article 4 by the Inter-American Commission, since they were linked to the
alleged forced disappearance (§ 95). However, the IACHR considered that all the facts that occurred following
the critical date and which referred to Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention (filing of a petition for habeas corpus,
criminal proceedings), were not excluded by the temporal limitation established by the State, since they constituted
"independent facts" or "specific and autonomous violations concerning denial of justice" (§ 85). On the merits,
it declared that the State had violated Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention, to the detriment of both sisters and
their next of kin (judgment of 1 March 2005).
98. In a more recent judgment, Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama of 12 August 2008, the San Jos6 Court made
a clear distinction between forced disappearances and extrajudicial killings for the purposes of its jurisdiction
ratione temporis. The case concerned the forced disappearance in 1970 (twenty years before Panama accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of the court) of Heliodoro Portugal, whose remains were found in 2000. It considered
that the victim should be presumed dead before the date of acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction (9 May 1990),
with regard to the fact that twenty years had elapsed since his disappearance. It characterised the extrajudicial
killing as an instantaneous act and accepted the Government's preliminary exception as regards the right to life
(Article 4). However, with regard to the forced disappearance as such, it applied its previous case-law and found
that it was a permanent or continuous violation, since it had been prolonged after the critical date until the victim's
remains were found in 2000. It was competent to examine the following violations arising out of the disappearance:
the deprivation of liberty of the victim (Article 7), the violation of the relatives' right to humane treatment (Article
5), the non-compliance with the obligation to investigate into the alleged disappearance, the failure to incriminate
forced disappearances and tortures in domestic law and the failure to investigate and punish acts of torture.' On
the merits, the IACHR went on to find a violation of the right to liberty (Article 7) and a violation of Articles I
and II of the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons with regard to the deceased. It
further found a breach of Articles 5 (right to humane treatment), 8 and 25 in respect of his relatives.
2. The United Nations Human Rights Committee ("HRC")
99. As regards forced disappearances, the HRC recognised "the degree of suffering involved in being held
indefinitely without contact with the outside world" and held that they constituted "cruel and inhuman treatment"
contrary to Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with regard to the disappeared.8
Disappearances often resulted in breaches of the right to life, embodied in Article 6 of the Covenant. In General
Comment No. 6 on the right to life, the HRC stated:
"States parties should also take specific and effective measures to prevent the disappearance of
individuals, something which unfortunately has become all too frequent and leads too often to
arbitrary deprivation of life. Furthermore, States should establish effective facilities and procedures
to investigate thoroughly cases of missing and disappeared persons in circumstances which may
involve a violation of the right to life." 9
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100. In a number of cases, the HRC has found that a breach of Article 6 of the Covenant has occurred, but
has been unable to make a final decision in that regard in the absence of confirmation of death.10 Disappearances
may also lead to violations of Articles 9 (right to liberty and security of person), 10 (right of all persons deprived
of their liberty to be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person) and 7
with regard to the relatives of the disappeared, in view of the stress, anguish and uncertainty caused by the
disappearance. 1
101. The positive obligation to investigate disappearances (mentioned in the General Comment on the right to
life) may also be breached in this type of case; in these situations there may be a breach of Article 2 § 3 (which
enshrines the right to an effective remedy) in conjunction with Article 6. The HRC, in General Comment No. 31
on Article 2 §§ 2 and 3 of the Covenant, emphasised that the failure to investigate in respect of grave violations
such as enforced disappearances or torture, as well as the failure to bring to justice perpetrators of such violations,
could give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant. The Committee was thus empowered to find a violation of
Articles 6, 7 and 9 read in conjunction with Article 2 § 3 of the Covenant.12
102. However, when the disappearance occurred before the date that the Covenant or the Optional Protocol
entered into force for a State, the approach of the HRC to whether it has temporal jurisdiction has evolved over
recent years.
103. In the cases of missing persons in Argentina (S.E. v. Argentina, 4 April 1990), the Committee had found
that Article 2 § 3 of the Covenant could not be violated by a State Party in the absence of jurisdiction over a
substantive violation. In Maria Otilia Vargas v. Chile, 26 July 1999, the HRC declared the communication
inadmissible ratione temporis in respect of the author's son, whose body had never been recovered since his death
in 1973. The Committee held that the Supreme Court's judgment of 1995 rejecting the author's complaint as
regards the application of the 1978 Amnesty Decree could not be regarded as a new event that could affect the
rights of a person who was killed in 1973, prior to the international entry into force of the Covenant and the entry
into force of the Optional Protocol for Chile.
104. In Sarma v Sri Lanka, 16 July 2003, the author alleged that his son had been removed by members of
the military in June 1990 and was last seen in October 1991. Sri Lanka became a party to the Optional Protocol
in October 1997 with a declaration limiting the Committee's competence to facts arising after this date. The
Committee found that although the initial abduction occurred outside their temporal jurisdiction "the alleged
violations of the Covenant, if confirmed on the merits, may have occurred or continued after the entry into force
of the Optional Protocol." 13 The Committee went on to find a violation of Articles 7 and 9 with regard to the
son and Article 7 with regard to the author and his wife due to their anguish and stress at not knowing their son's
whereabouts. The HRC also emphasised that the State had a duty under Article 2 § 3 "to provide the author and
his family with an effective remedy, including a thorough and effective investigation into the disappearance and
fate of the author's son..." 14 which implied that the State might have an obligation to investigate matters which
had occurred before the entry into force of the Optional Protocol. Finally, it refrained from finding a violation of
Article 6, since the author had not abandoned hope for his son's reappearance.
105. However, in Yurich v. Chile (12 December 2005), the Committee, although describing enforced disappear-
ance as a continuing act, noted that the original acts of arrest and abduction, as well as the refusal to give information
about the deprivation of freedom, had occurred before the entry into force of the Covenant for Chile. The HRC
further considered that the author had made no reference to any action of the State after the crucial date (entry
into force of the Optional Protocol) that would constitute "a confirmation of the enforced disappearance". For
these reasons, it declared the application inadmissible.
106. More recently in Sankara v. Burkina Faso, 28 March 2006 (see Appendix III, p. 52), the HRC applied
this act of confirmation approach, and also changed its analysis in considering a failure to investigate a death
which had taken place prior to the critical date. Although it found that it had no jurisdiction ratione temporis over
the death of Mr Sankara, it went on to consider the subsequent proceedings and failure to correct his death warrant
(which stated the cause of death as natural) and their effect on Mr Sankara's wife and two children. It found that
there had been a failure to conduct an inquiry into Mr Sankara's death, to prosecute those responsible and to
conclude legal proceedings begun by the author to remedy this situation. It concluded that the proceedings had
been prolonged at the fault of the authorities, the delay continuing after the entry into force of the Covenant and
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Optional Protocol. The authors were therefore affected by the authorities' failures after this entry into force, and
that gave the Committee with jurisdiction ratione temporis over the Article 7 claim.
107. On the merits, the Committee went on to find that "the refusal to conduct an investigation into the death
of Thomas Sankara, the lack of official recognition of his place of burial and the failure to correct the death
certificate constitute inhuman treatment of Ms. Sankara and her sons, in breach of Article 7 of the Covenant." 15
THE LAW
I. THE STATUS OF THE MISSING MEN AS NAMED FIRST APPLICANTS
A. Submissions to the Court
108. The respondent Government submitted that the established case-law on disappearances showed that after
a certain lapse of time there was a presumption of death (e.g. Timurtao v. Turkey, no. 23531/94, § 83, ECHR
2000-VI - presumption of death after six and a half years). Given the situation of armed conflict at the time, the
absence of any credible evidence that the missing persons had been seen after the end of hostilities and the lapse
of time, a presumption of death accorded with the Court's constant case-law, as well as national practice, in which
context Cypriot law provided that a person could be declared dead if there had been no news of them for ten
years.
109. The applicants submitted that there was no basis for presuming that the missing men were dead, or had
died in 1974. Cypriot domestic law only permitted the finding of a presumption of death on the application of
persons with requisite standing, while in the Strasbourg cases cited by the Government the applicants themselves
had asked the Court to make findings of presumption of death in order to support allegations of substantive
violations.
110. The intervening Cypriot Government refuted the assertion that the missing men should be presumed dead.
Such a presumption could only be made at the request of the applicants.
B. The Court's findings
111. The Court observes that the parties' submissions on whether the missing men may be presumed dead
were made in the context of its competence ratione temporis but notes that they also have relevance to the issue
of the standing of the first applicants. According to the Court's practice, and consonant with Article 34 of
Convention, applications can only be introduced by, or in the name of, individuals who are alive. Where a person
dies after introduction of an application, his or her heirs may seek to continue the application without the name
of the application changing. If the alleged victim of a violation has died before the introduction of the application,
it may be possible for the person with requisite legal interest as next-of-kin to introduce an application raising
complaints related to the death; however the application is registered in the relative's own name (see, concerning
standing to introduce applications, Fairfield v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 24790/04, ECHR 2005-VI). The
Court recalls that in its previous judgments concerning disappearances the practice has been to name only the
relatives of the disappeared person as applicants.
112. As regards the missing men in these applications, it must, firstly, be noted that the remains of Savvas
Hadjipanteli were discovered in 2007 in a mass grave near Galatia within the area of the "TRNC". No indication
of the approximate date and time of death has been included in the forensic or medical certificates, although the
few details given support the hypothesis of an extra-judicial execution of prisoners at or about the time of hostilities
in 1974. Secondly, there has been no sighting or news of the other eight missing men since late 1974. The Court
does not however consider it necessary to rule on whether the missing men should or should not be admitted to
the status of applicants since, in any event, there is no question but that the close relatives of the missing men
may introduce applications raising complaints concerning their disappearance, to the extent that such complaints
fall within the Court's competence (see e.g. Kurt v. Turkey, 25 May 1998, Reports 1998-IH; Imakayeva v. Russia,
no. 7615/02, ECHR 2006-XIII (extracts)).
113. The Court is satisfied that it can continue to examine these applications on the basis that the relatives of
the missing persons, who introduced these complaints, are the applicants for the purposes of Article 34 of the
Convention.
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H. THE GOVERNMENT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
A. Lack of legal interest
114. The Government submitted at the hearing that there was no legal interest in determining these applications.
Pointing out that the disappearances of all the missing Greek Cypriots had been subject to examination and findings
of violations in the fourth inter-State case, they referred to Article 35 § 2 (b) which barred examination of
applications which were "substantially the same". They also referred to Article 37 § 1 (c) which allowed the
Court to strike a case from the list where "for any other reason the Court finds it no longer justified to pursue
the examination of the application".
115. The applicants replied that the inter-State case had not subsumed their claims which were individual and
distinct and that there was no basis for applying Article 37 § 1 (c).
116. The intervening Government considered that the cause, object and parties were not identical and that there
was no basis for rejecting the applications on these grounds.
117. The Court recalls that in its decision on admissibility in these applications the Commission left open the
general question whether it was precluded under the former Article 27 § 1 (b) from examining in the context of
an individual application a "matter" which had already been examined in an inter-State case (decision of 14 April
1998, Decisions and Reports (DR) 73, p. 5, referring to nos. 5577/72-5583/72, Donnelly and Others v. the United
Kingdom). It considered in any event that it had not been established that its previous findings in the third inter-
State application concerned the missing men in the present applications and that as the examination of the merits
remained to be carried out in the pending fourth inter-State application, the matter could not be regarded as having
already been examined in that context either.
118. A judgment has since been delivered in the fourth inter-State case (cited above) and it is true that this
included findings of violations under Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the Convention concerning missing Greek Cypriots
and their families. However, for an application to be substantially the same as another which has already been
examined by the Court or other procedure of international investigation or settlement for the purposes of Article
34 § 2 (b), it must concern substantially not only the same facts and complaints but be introduced by the same
persons (Ingebjorg Folger0 and Others v. Norway (dec.), no. 15472/02, 14 February 2006; Malsagova and Others
v. Russia (dec.), no. 27244/03, 6 March 2008). It is therefore not the case that by introducing an inter-State
application an applicant Government thereby deprives individual applicants of the possibility of introducing, or
pursuing, their own claims.
119. In so far as the respondent Government have, at a very late stage, challenged the applicants' legal interest
in pursuing this application and invoked Article 37 § 1 (c), the Court would note that the findings in the fourth
inter-State case did not specify in respect of which individual missing persons they were made (cited above, at
§ 133, where the evidence was found to bear out the assertion that "many persons now missing" had been detained
by the respondent Government or forces for which they were responsible). That judgment cannot therefore be
regarded as determining the issues and claims arising in the present applications. In that regard, it should also be
noted that in individual applications the Court has the competence to issue just satisfaction awards for pecuniary
and non-pecuniary damage suffered by individual applicants and to give indications under Article 46 as to any
general or individual measures that might be taken. It cannot be said therefore that the present applications are
incapable of giving rise to issues or outcomes different to those of the fourth inter-State case, or that the individual
applicants' interests have somehow been subsumed by the judgment in that case such that it is no longer justified
to continue the examination of their applications. The Court is accordingly satisfied that a legal interest remains
in pursuing the examination of these applications.
120. These objections are therefore rejected.
B. Objection ratione temporis
1. The Chamber judgment
121. The Chamber excluded from its examination any allegations of violations based on facts occurring before
the crucial date of ratification of the right of individual petition by Turkey on 28 January 1987. It noted that the
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Grand Chamber in the fourth inter-State case had found that the disappearance of some 1,485 Greek Cypriots
disclosed a situation of continuing violation under Article 2 in so far as the authorities of the respondent State
had failed to conduct an effective investigation aimed at clarifying the whereabouts and fate of the persons who
had gone missing in life-threatening circumstances. It found no reason to differ as concerned the nine missing
men in this case and concluded that to the extent that there was a continuing obligation under Article 2 it had
competence ratione temporis.
2. Submissions to the Court
a. The respondent Government
122. The Government submitted that temporal jurisdiction was a vital precondition to the examination of these
cases. They argued that the Chamber had failed to apply the principles laid down in the Grand Chamber judgment
in Bleli v. Croatia ([GC] no. 59532/00, ECHR 2006-III) with due regard to international practice. They stated
that the assertion of a continuing situation was not sufficient or decisive, since the determining question was
whether an obligation bound the State at the moment of the facts giving rise to the dispute. Issues of continuing
situation or violation only came into play after the establishment of a norm binding the State from that moment
and for the future, as shown by the terms of Article 6 of Protocol No. 11 itself. Turkey had only recognised the
competence of the Commission to receive individual petitions as from 28 January 1987; this only concerned
matters raised in respect of facts which occurred subsequent to the Turkish declaration
123. Thus, in the present cases, the Government stressed that the allegations of disappearances rested on facts
occurring in July-August 1974; none of the purported sightings of the missing men had occurred after October
1974. The Government, however, had only recognised the right of individual petition on 28 January 1987 as
concerned complaints about facts arising after that date. Thus, the Court had no temporal jurisdiction over the
events in issue. While the Chamber judgment purported to apply the approach of the fourth inter-State case to
this issue, the Government pointed out that temporal jurisdiction was not in issue in that case, the Chamber
confusing this aspect with issues on the merits concerning the existence of a continuing situation. Further, neither
Bleli6 nor the Turkish declaration made any exception concerning continuing situations. They noted that the Bleli6
judgment referred to Moldovan and Others v. Romania ((dec.), nos. 41138/98 and 64320/01, 13 March 2001)
which found, as regarded complaints under Article 2 about ineffective investigations into killings, that there was
no temporal jurisdiction where the killings had taken place before ratification. This showed that the consequences
flowing from the initial facts could not be examined either, excluding so-called continuing situations, as shown
by subsequent cases such as Kholodov and Kholodova v. Russia ((dec.), no. 30651/05, 14 September 2006) in
which the Court had found that the subsequent failure of remedies aimed at redressing an earlier interference could
not bring the matter within temporal jurisdiction (the Government also cited Dinchev v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 23057/
03, 6 March 2007; Meriakri v. Moldova (dec.), no. 53487/99, 16 January 2001; Mrki6 v. Croatia (dec.), no. 7118/
03, 8 June 2006; and Cakir v. Cyprus (dec), no. 7864/06, 11 January 2008), where complaints about a killing in
1974 were rejected due to a temporal bar). The Chamber should therefore not only have refrained from examining
the facts in 1974 but also the procedures and facts which flowed from or were linked with those facts. Its contrary
approach was inconsistent with constant practice. Rejecting the preliminary objection on the basis of a finding of
the existence of a continuing obligation effectively prejudged the merits.
124. In so far as the applicants argued that the obligation to investigate was autonomous, this issue had been
settled in Blejic which made it clear that procedures which concerned the failure to provide a remedy did not
affect temporal jurisdiction for events and facts before ratification. There could be no freestanding procedural
obligation, divorced from the factual origin of the complaints. The Government further argued that the procedural
obligation to investigate under Articles 2 and 3 was recent and could not be regarded as binding States beforehand.
It relied in this respect on the Court's judgments in Markovic and Others v. Italy ([GC], no. 1398/03, § 111,
ECHR 2006-...) and Korbely v. Hungary [GC], no. 9174/02, § 84, 19 September 2008, ECHR 2008-...).
125. As concerned the alleged continuing situation, the Government submitted that the Chamber had omitted
to take into account the established case-law on disappearances, which showed that after a certain lapse of time
there was a presumption of death (see also their argument set out at paragraph 108 above). These applicants must




126. The applicants submitted that the Court had jurisdiction to examine continuing violations which, although
tracing their historical starting point to a moment in the past, continued on or after Turkey's recognition of the
right of individual petition (they cited Loizidou v. Turkey, 18 December 1996, §§ 41 and 47, Reports 1996-VI).
Although the first applicants did disappear in 1974, the violations arising from and/or in connection with these
disappearances had continued since then. They denied that their complaints-were based on instantaneous acts in
1974 but argued that they concerned violations of a continuing nature which survived any temporal restriction
and carried on to the present day. They relied on the Court's reasoning as regards the continuing nature of the
violations arising out of disappearances in 1974 set out in the fourth inter-State case which was, in their view,
correctly followed in the Chamber judgment.
127. The applicants submitted that there was no basis for presuming the missing men were dead, or had died
in 1974. The reference to Cypriot domestic law was of no relevance since this only permitted the finding of a
presumption of death where the Attorney-General or a person with legal standing (claiming rights that flowed
from the death of the missing person) made such application. Nor was the Court's case-law on Article 2 relevant,
since these were cases in which the applicants themselves had asked the Court to make findings of presumption
of death in order to support allegations of substantive violations. Allowing the Government to have the missing
men presumed dead might also be regarded as tantamount to a de iure violation or execution contrary to Article 2.
c. The Government of Cyprus
128. The intervening Government submitted that the present applications did not concern Turkey's responsibility
for acts or omissions which took place at a time when Turkey had not accepted the Convention. Turkey had
adhered to the Convention in 1954 and could have been subject from that time to proceedings initiated by other
Contracting Parties. The cases relied on by the Government such as Bleic did not assist since the violations had
occurred before the respondent State ratified the Convention while the present complaints concerned continuing
violations occurring more than 50 years after Turkey became bound by the substantive provisions of the Convention.
The present claims were also based upon the facts concerning Turkey's conduct after 28 January 1987 in failing
to provide an investigation into the disappearances. This failure was not an aspect of any unlawful killing or
detention or a consequence of a violation of Article 2 or 5 but triggered separately. The temporal objection was
thus misconceived.
129. The intervening Government rejected the assertion that the missing men should be presumed dead. Such
a presumption could only be made at the request of the applicants and in any event did not put an end to any
obligation to investigate, which obligation was not limited to the question of whether the person was dead but
also covered the circumstances in which they died and, in the case of unlawful killing, the identification and
prosecution of any perpetrator.
3. The Court's assessment
a. General principles
130. It is beyond dispute that in accordance with the general rules of international law (see, in particular Article
28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969) the provisions of the Convention do not
bind a Contracting Party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist
before the date of the entry into force of the Convention with respect to that Party (see Blei6, cited above, § 70;
and Silih v. Slovenia, [GC] no. 71463/01, § 140, ECHR 2009-...). Furthermore, where there are proceedings
instituted by an applicant to obtain redress for an act, omission or decision alleged to violate the Convention and
which occur or continue after the entry into force of the Convention, these procedures cannot be regarded as part
of the facts constitutive of the alleged violation and do not bring the case within the Court's temporal jurisdiction
(Bleli6, cited above, §§ 77-79).
131. In order to establish the Court's temporal jurisdiction it is therefore essential to identify, in each specific
case, the exact time of the alleged interference. In doing so the Court must take into account both the facts of
which the applicant complains and the scope of the Convention right alleged to have been violated (Bleli6, § 72).
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b. Application in the present case
132. Turkey ratified the Convention on 18 May 1954; it accepted the right of individual petition on 28 January
1987 and the jurisdiction of the old Court on 22 January 1990. Protocol No. 11, which brought the new Court
into existence, came into force on 11 January 1998.
133. Turkey was accordingly bound by the provisions of the Convention from 18 May 1954. However, its
acceptance of the right of individual petition was limited to facts taking place after the date of the declaration to
that effect on 28 January 1987. When the old Court ceased to function in 1998, this Court's jurisdiction became
obligatory and ran from the acceptance by a Contracting State of the right of individual petition. It follows that
the Court is not competent to examine any complaints raised by these applicants against Turkey in so far as the
alleged violations are based on facts having occurred before 28 January 1987 (see Cankopak v. Turkey, nos. 25182/
94 and 26956/95, § 26, 20 February 2001, Demades v. Turkey (just satisfaction), no. 16219/90, § 21, 22 April
2008).
134. On that basis, any complaints by the applicants asserting the responsibility of the Contracting State for
factual events in 1974 are outside the Court's temporal jurisdiction. In so far as any complaints are raised concerning
acts or omissions of the Contracting State after 28 January 1987, the Court may take cognisance of them. It notes
in this respect that the applicants specified that their claims related only to the situation pertaining after January
1987, namely the continuing failure to account for the fate and whereabouts of the missing men by providing an
effective investigation.
135. The Court notes that the respondent Government raised two principal strands of argument against the
applicants' claims that a procedural obligation could exist after the critical date. The first concerns the nature of
the procedural obligation under Article 2 and the second relies on a presumption that the missing men in fact died
in or about 1974. The Court will also consider, lastly, the nature and scope of the procedural obligation to investigate
disappearances in particular.
i. Temporal jurisdiction and the procedural obligation under Article 2
a. Procedures linked to facts outside temporal jurisdiction
136. The respondent Government argued, relying on Bledi6, that complaints concerning such investigations, or
lack of them, fell foul of the principle that procedures aimed at redressing violations do not affect the lack of
temporal jurisdiction for facts occurring beforehand. However, this argument fails since the procedural obligation
to investigate under Article 2 is not a procedure of redress within the meaning of Article 35 § 1. The lack of an
effective investigation itself is the heart of the alleged violation. It has its own distinct scope of application which
can operate independently from the substantive limb of Article 2, which is concerned with State responsibility for
any unlawful death or life-threatening disappearance, as shown by the numerous cases decided by the Court where
a procedural violation has been found in the absence of any finding that State agents were responsible for the use
of lethal force (see, amongst many examples, Finucane v. the United Kingdom, no. 29178/95, ECHR 2003-VIII).
Indeed the procedural obligation to provide some form of effective official investigation arises when individuals
have gone missing in life-threatening circumstances and is not confined to cases where it is apparent that the
disappearance was caused by an agent of the State (see Osmanoglu v. Turkey, no. 48804/99, § 87, 24 January
2008).
137. For these reasons, therefore, the Government's reliance on the reasoning in Blei6 concerning procedures
for redress is misconceived.
13. Reliance on earlier Court decisions rejecting procedural complaints as incompati-
ble ratione temporis
138. In so far as the respondent Government relied on cases such as Moldovan and Others and Kholodov and
Kholodova (see paragraph 123 above), the Court notes that these did not concern disappearances but killings. The
Court has recently delivered its judgment in Silih, cited above, which reviewed the jurisprudence on the question
whether a procedural violation could be found where a death occurred before the date of acceptance of the right
of individual petition and the alleged deficiencies or omissions in investigative measures took place afterwards
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(at § § 148-152). The Grand Chamber judgment set out in detail international law materials, in particular from the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the United Nations Human Rights Committee, which indicated that
these bodies accepted jurisdiction ratione temporis over the procedural complaints concerning investigations into
deaths even where the lethal acts had taken place before the critical date (see Silih, §§ 111-118, 160). It then
proceeded to clarify that the procedural obligation to carry out an investigation into deaths under Article 2 had
evolved in its own case-law into a separate and autonomous duty; it could be considered to be a "detachable
obligation" capable of binding the State even when the death took place before the entry into force of the
Convention (see Silih, §§ 153-163).
139. The precedents relied on by the respondent Government are therefore not of any assistance as regards
killings. Nor did they have any bearing on the phenomenon of disappearances, the continuing nature of which
has implications for the ratione temporis jurisdiction of the Court, as examined below.
*y. Purported retrospective application of the procedural obligation
140. In so far as the Government also argued that the procedural obligation under Article 2 could not apply
at the time of their acceptance of the right of individual petition as it was only developed in the Court's case-law
at a later date, the Court would note that the references relied on in Markovic and Korbely related, respectively,
to whether a right had existed in domestic law at the relevant time for the purposes of Article 6 and to the principles
set out in Article 7 against the retroactive imposition of criminal penalties. Neither has any relevance to the way
in which the Court itself interprets the content of the obligations binding Contracting States under the Convention,
which interpretation cannot be equated to a retroactive imposition of liability. The Court would observe that case-
law is a means of clarifying pre-existing texts to which the principle of non-retroactivity does not apply in the
same manner as to legislative enactments.
ii. Presumption of death
141. The respondent Government asserted that the missing men had to be presumed dead long before any
temporal jurisdiction arose in 1987; thus, there was no "disappearance" to be investigated after that date.
142. Domestically, as pointed out by the applicants and intervening Government, it is commonplace that after
a period of some years (seven to ten on average) the relatives of the missing person or a designated State official
may take proceedings to establish a presumption of death. This has the purpose of promoting legal certainty and
allowing those affected by the disappearance to deal with matters of property and family status. It benefits the
next of kin or those with due legal standing. The fact that there is a ten year threshold which may be invoked by
the relatives of missing persons in the Cyprus legal system does not, however, render that provision applicable
by analogy in the proceedings before this Court.
143. In Convention case-law, as pointed out by the respondent Government, the Court has on numerous occasions
made findings of fact to the effect that a missing person can be presumed dead (see, amongst many judgments,
Lyanova and Aliyeva v. Russia, nos. 12713/02 and 28440/03, §§ 94-95, 2 October 2008). Generally, this finding
of fact has been reached in response to claims made by the respondent Government that the person is still alive
or has not been shown to have died at the hands of State agents. This presumption of death is not automatic and
is only reached on examination of the circumstances of the case, in which the lapse of time since the person was
seen alive or heard from is a relevant element (see, for example, Vagapova and Zubirayev v. Russia, no. 21080/
05, H§ 85-86, 26 February 2009, concerning a presumption of death reached where a young man, who disappeared
in life-threatening circumstances, had been missing for over four years).
144. The Court would here distinguish between the making of a factual presumption and the legal consequences
that may flow from such a presumption. Even if there was an evidential basis which might justify finding that
the nine missing men died in or closely after the events in 1974, this would not dispose of the applicants' complaints
concerning the lack of an effective investigation.
145. The Court would recall that the procedural obligation to investigate under Article 2 where there has been
an unlawful or suspicious death is triggered by, in most cases, the discovery of the body or the occurrence of
death. Where disappearances in life-threatening circumstances are concerned, the procedural obligation to investigate
can hardly come to an end on discovery of the body or the presumption of death; this merely casts light on one
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aspect of the fate of the missing person. An obligation to account for the disappearance and death, and to identify
and prosecute any perpetrator of unlawful acts in that connection, will generally remain.
146. The Court therefore concludes that even though a lapse of over 34 years without any news of the missing
persons may provide strong circumstantial evidence that they have died meanwhile, this does not remove the
procedural obligation to investigate.
iii. The nature of the procedural obligation to investigate disappearances
147. The Court would emphasise that, as found in Silih v. Slovenia concerning the procedural obligation under
Article 2 to investigate unlawful or suspicious deaths, the procedural obligation under Article 2 arising from
disappearances operates independently of the substantive obligation. It notes that the Inter-American Court, and
to some extent the Human Rights Committee, apply the same approach to the procedural aspect of disappearances
(see paragraphs 93-107 above), examining allegations of denial of justice or judicial protection even where the
disappearance occurred before recognition of its jurisdiction.
148. There is however an important distinction to be drawn in the Court's case-law between the obligation to
investigate a suspicious death and the obligation to investigate a suspicious disappearance. A disappearance is a
distinct phenomenon, characterised by an ongoing situation of uncertainty and unaccountability in which there is
a lack of information or even a deliberate concealment and obfuscation of what has occurred (see also the definitions
of disappearance set out above in II B. International law documents on enforced disappearances). This situation
is very often drawn out over time, prolonging the torment of the victim's relatives. It cannot therefore be said
that a disappearance is, simply, an "instantaneous" act or event; the additional distinctive element of subsequent
failure to account for the whereabouts and fate of the missing person gives rise to a continuing situation. Thus,
the procedural obligation will, potentially, persist as long as the fate of the person is unaccounted for; the ongoing
failure to provide the requisite investigation will be regarded as a continuing violation (see the fourth inter-State
case, § 136). This is so, even where death may, eventually, be presumed.
149. It may be noted that the approach applied in Silih v. Slovenia (cited above, § 163) concerning the requirement
of proximity of the death and investigative steps to the date of entry into force of the Convention applies only in
the context of killings or suspicious deaths, where the anchoring factual element, the loss of life of the victim, is
known for a certainty, even if the exact cause or ultimate responsibility is not. The procedural obligation in that
context is not of a continuing nature in the sense described above.
iv. Conclusion
150. The Court rejects the Government's objections as to lack of temporal jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the
question whether there was a continuing procedural obligation to investigate the fate and whereabouts of the
missing men at the time of the introduction of these applications remains to be examined.
C. Six-month rule (Article 35 § 1 of the Convention)
1. The Chamber judgment
151. The Chamber considered that, even in continuing situations there might arise a time, having regard to the
purpose of legal certainty enshrined in the six-month rule and considerations of the practical and effective functioning
of the Convention mechanism, when it could reasonably be expected that an applicant should not wait any longer
in bringing an application to Strasbourg. Thus, applicants in disappearance cases could be required to show
reasonable expedition in lodging complaints. In these applications however, introduced some three years after the
ratification by Turkey of the right of individual petition and some three days after Turkey's acceptance of the
jurisdiction of the old Court, against a background of consecutive inter-State applications the results of which had
still not been made public, there had been no unreasonable delay by these applicants in introducing their complaints.
2. Submissions to the Court
a. The respondent Government
152. The Government submitted that there was inexplicable inconsistency between the approach taken in
Karabardak and Others v. Cyprus and Baybora and Others v. Cyprus ((decs.), nos. 76575/01 and 77116/01, 22
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October 2002) and the Chamber judgment in the present case. In the former, the Court had found that the lapse
of time between the facts and the introduction of the applications by Turkish Cypriot applicants was too long,
without mention of any apparent continuing violation. On that basis, the present applications should also have
been rejected as out of time. The fact that the applications were introduced three years after ratification in Varnava
while thirteen years had elapsed in the cases against Cyprus had no logical bearing on the different approaches
applied in regard to the six-month rule. Furthermore, in Baybora and Karabardak the applicants were seemingly
reproached for not taking their cases to the CMP although that had already been found by the Court to be an
ineffective remedy.
153. The Government concluded that if the CMP was indeed an ineffective remedy as claimed by the present
applicants they should have brought their applications to the Commission at the latest six months after the date
of ratification on 27 January 1987. They noted that the decisions in Baybora and Karabardak were completely
silent on when time began to run. This difference in treatment between applicants in Turkish Cypriot and Greek
Cypriot cases, which concerned the same allegations in the same historical and geographical context, aggravated
the suffering of the Turkish Cypriot applicants.
b. The applicants
154. The applicants submitted that the six-month rule did not apply to continuing violations. As concerned the
Baybora and Karabardak cases, they considered that these could be distinguished from their own applications as,
firstly, Turkey had been notified about their missing relatives by the end of September 1974 and the nine men
had also been included in the group of missing persons listed by the Cyprus Government in the four inter-State
cases between 1974 and 1994; secondly, their applications had been lodged on 25 January 1990, three days after
Turkey's acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction (whereas the Turkish Cypriot applications had been lodged over
a decade later); and the Turkish Cypriot applications had been introduced in the absence of any effort by the
families to exhaust domestic remedies available since 1964 in the domestic system of Cyprus whereas Greek
Cypriots had had no access to any domestic remedy in Turkey.
c. The intervening Government
155. The Cypriot Government submitted that there had been no inordinate delay by the applicants in lodging
their complaints; this distinguished their cases from the Turkish Cypriot cases where the applicants had not acted
for over twenty years after the investigation into the disappearances had been terminated by the ICRC and UN
civilian police in 1968 and thirteen years after Cyprus had accepted the right of individual petition.
3. The Court's assessment
a. General principles
156. The object of the six-month time-limit under Article 35 § 1 is to promote legal certainty, by ensuring that
cases raising issues under the Convention are dealt with in a reasonable time and that past decisions are not
continually open to challenge. It marks out the temporal limits of supervision carried out by the organs of the
Convention and signals to both individuals and State authorities the period beyond which such supervision is no
longer possible (see, amongst other authorities, Walker v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 34979/97, ECHR 2000-1).
157. As a rule, the six-month period runs from the date of the final decision in the process of exhaustion of
domestic remedies. Where it is clear from the outset however that no effective remedy is available to the applicant,
the period runs from the date of the acts or measures complained of, or from the date of knowledge of that act
or its effect on or prejudice to the applicant (Dennis and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 76573/01, 2
July 2002). Nor can Article 35 § 1 be interpreted in a manner which would require an applicant to seize the Court
of his complaint before his position in connection with the matter has been finally settled at the domestic level.
Where, therefore, an applicant avails himself of an apparently existing remedy and only subsequently becomes
aware of circumstances which render the remedy ineffective, it may be appropriate for the purposes of Article 35
§ 1 to take the start of the six-month period from the date when the applicant first became or ought to have become
aware of those circumstances (see Paul and Aubrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 46477/99, 4 June
2001).
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158. Consequently, where a death has occurred, applicant relatives are expected to take steps to keep track of
the investigation's progress, or lack thereof, and to lodge their applications with due expedition once they are, or
should have become, aware of the lack of any effective criminal investigation (see Bulut and Yavuz v. Turkey
(dec.), no. 73065/01, 28 May 2002; also Bayram and Ytldrtm v. Turkey (dec.), no. 38587/97, ECHR 2002-III).
The same principles have been applied, mutatis mutandis, to disappearance cases (see Eren and Others v. Turkey
(dec.), no. 42428/98, 4 July 2002, and Upak and Kargili and Others v. Turkey (dec.), nos. 75527/01 and 11837/
02, 28 March 2006).
159. Nonetheless it has been said that the six month time-limit does not apply as such to continuing situations
(see, for example, Agrotexim Hellos S.A. and Others v. Greece, no. 14807/89, Commission decision of 12 February
1991, DR 71, p. 148, and Cone v. Romania, no. 35935/02, § 22, 24 June 2008); this is because, if there is a
situation of ongoing breach, the time-limit in effect starts afresh each day and it is only once the situation ceases
that the final period of six months will run to its end. In the fourth inter-State case, where it was implicit that a
similar approach was applicable to a continuing practice - and in that case it was a continuous failure to comply
with the obligation to investigate disappearances - the Court notes that the issue of the six-month rule had been
joined to the merits by the Commission and neither Government had since made any submissions on the point
(§§ 103-104). The issue was thus not addressed expressly by the Court in that judgment. It therefore falls to the
Court to resolve the point in the present case.
b. Applicability of time constraints to procedural obligations under Article 2 of the Convention
160. The Court cannot emphasise enough that the Convention is a system for the protection of human rights
and that it is of crucial importance that it is interpreted and applied in a manner that renders these rights practical
and effective, not theoretical and illusory. This concerns not only the interpretation of substantive provisions of
the Convention, but also procedural provisions; it impacts on the obligations imposed on respondent Governments,
but also has effects on the position of applicants. For example, while it is essential for the efficacy of the system
that Contracting States comply with their obligation not to hinder the applicant in the exercise of the right of
individual petition, individuals nonetheless bear the responsibility of co-operating with procedures flowing from
the introduction of their complaints, assisting in clarifying any factual issues where such lie within their knowledge
and in maintaining and supporting the applications introduced on their behalf (see Kapan v. Turkey, no. 22057/
93, Commission decision of 13 January 1997, DR 88-B, p. 17). On the same basis, where time is of the essence
in resolving the issues in a case, there is a burden on the applicant to ensure that his or her claims are raised
before the Court with the necessary expedition to ensure that they may be properly, and fairly, resolved.
161. In that context, the Court would confirm the approach adopted by the Chamber in the present applications.
Not all continuing situations are the same; the nature of the situation may be such that the passage of time affects
what is at stake. In cases of disappearances, just as it is imperative that the relevant domestic authorities launch
an investigation and take measures as soon as a person has disappeared in life-threatening circumstances, it is
indispensable that the applicants, who are the relatives of missing persons, do not delay unduly in bringing a
complaint about the ineffectiveness or lack of such investigation before the Court. With the lapse of time, memories
of witnesses fade, witnesses may die or become untraceable, evidence deteriorates or ceases to exist, and the
prospects that any effective investigation can be undertaken will increasingly diminish; and the Court's own
examination and judgment may be deprived of meaningfulness and effectiveness. Accordingly, where disappearances
are concerned, applicants cannot wait indefinitely before coming to Strasbourg. They must make proof of a certain
amount of diligence and initiative and introduce their complaints without undue delay. What this involves is
examined below.
c. Undue delay in disappearance cases
162. The Court would comment, firstly, that a distinction must be drawn with cases of unlawful or violent
death. In those cases, there is generally a precise point in time at which death is known to have occurred and
some basic facts are in the public domain. The lack of progress or ineffectiveness of an investigation will generally
be more readily apparent. Accordingly the requirements of expedition may require an applicant to bring such a
case before Strasbourg within a matter of months, or at most, depending on the circumstances, a very few years
after events. In disappearance cases, where there is a state of ignorance and uncertainty and, by definition, a failure
to account for what has happened, if not an appearance of deliberate concealment and obstruction on the part of
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some authorities, the situation is less clear-cut. It is more difficult for the relatives of the missing to assess what
is happening, or what can be expected to happen. Allowances must be made for the uncertainty and confusion
which frequently mark the aftermath of a disappearance.
163. Secondly, the Court would take cognisance of the international materials on enforced disappearances. The
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance stipulates that any time-
limit on the prosecution of disappearance offences should be of long duration proportionate to the seriousness of
the offence, while the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court excludes any statute of limitations as
regards the prosecution of international crimes against humanity, which includes enforced disappearances. Bearing
in mind therefore the consensus that it should be possible to prosecute the perpetrators of such crimes even many
years after the events, the Court considers that the serious nature of disappearances is such that the standard of
expedition expected of the relatives cannot be rendered too rigorous in the context of Convention protection.
164. Thirdly, in line with the principle of subsidiarity, it is best for the facts of cases to be investigated and
issues to be resolved in so far as possible at the domestic level. It is in the interests of the applicant, and the
efficacy of the Convention system, that the domestic authorities, who are best placed to do so, act to put right
any alleged breaches of the Convention.
165. Nonetheless, the Court considers that applications can be rejected as out of time in disappearance cases
where there has been excessive or unexplained delay on the part of applicants once they have, or should have,
become aware that no investigation has been instigated or that the investigation has lapsed into inaction or become
ineffective and, in any of those eventualities, there is no immediate, realistic prospect of an effective investigation
being provided in the future. Where there are initiatives being pursued in regard to a disappearance situation,
applicants may reasonably await developments which could resolve crucial factual or legal issues. Indeed, as long
as there is some meaningful contact between families and authorities concerning complaints and requests for
information, or some indication, or realistic possibility, of progress in investigative measures, considerations of
undue delay will not generally arise. However, where there has been a considerable lapse of time, and there have
been significant delays and lulls in investigative activity, there will come a moment when the relatives must realise
that no effective investigation has been, or will be provided. When this stage is reached will depend, unavoidably,
on the circumstances of the particular case.
166. In a complex disappearance situation such as the present, arising in a situation of international conflict,
where it is alleged that there is a complete absence of any investigation or meaningful contact with the authorities,
it may be expected that the relatives bring the case within, at most, several years of the incident. If there is an
investigation of sorts, even if sporadic and plagued by problems, the relatives may reasonably wait some years
longer until hope of progress being made has effectively evaporated. Where more than ten years has elapsed, the
applicants would generally have to show convincingly that there was some ongoing, and concrete, advance being
achieved to justify further delay in coming to Strasbourg. Stricter expectations would apply in cases where the
applicants have direct domestic access to the investigative authorities.
d. Application in the present case
167. These applicants introduced their applications on 25 January 1990, some fifteen years after their relatives
went missing in 1974. The Court notes that the disappearances were brought to the attention of the respondent
Government in or about 1974 by the intervening Government and the International Committee of the Red Cross.
The intervening Government also introduced a series of applications from 1974 which brought complaints arising
out of the events, including the missing persons problem, before the Commission in Strasbourg. Throughout the
1980, there were ongoing procedures on these issues. However, only the fourth inter-State case, lodged much later
in 1994, was able to be brought before this Court, after Turkey accepted the Court's jurisdiction; the previous
three applications which were before the Commission, ended in reports which went to the Committee of Ministers,
none of which were made available publicly before 1992, many years after their adoption (see the fourth inter-
State case, § 17).
168. The post-conflict situation in Cyprus meanwhile fell under the competence of the United Nations which
took over supervision of the Buffer Zone between the two opposing sides. From the beginning efforts were also
made to set up a mechanism to deal with the problem of disappearances, leading in 1981 to the setting up of the
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United Nations Committee on Missing Persons (CMP). The Court notes that the functioning of the CMP was
plagued from inception by disagreements of the parties, lack of co-operation and obstruction. However, information
about the progress of the CMP's work was limited due to the strict confidentiality of its procedure. It is apparent
that actual work on cases started in 1984 and concrete investigative steps were being taken in the following years.
In April 1990 the CMP issued a lengthy press release highlighting fundamental difficulties with hearing witnesses,
locating bodies and obtaining disinterments. This was followed by further efforts by the United Nations Secretary-
General to revitalise the CMP. It was not until 2006 that, finally, the CMP launched exhumations and began to
locate and identify remains.
169. Against that background, the question arises at what point the applicants should have come to Strasbourg.
It would not have been possible prior to 1987. The respondent Government submitted that they should have brought
their applications within six months of the date of acceptance of the right of individual petition on 28 January
1987; in their view, 25 January 1990 was too late.
170. The Court considers that the applicants, who were amongst a large group of persons affected by the
disappearances, could, in the exceptional situation of international conflict where no normal investigative procedures
were available, reasonably await the outcome of the initiatives taken by their Government and the United Nations.
These procedures could have resulted in steps being taken to investigate known sites of mass graves and provided
the basis for further measures. The Court is satisfied, however, that by the end of 1990 it must have become
apparent that the problematic, non-binding, confidential nature of these processes no longer offered any realistic
hope of progress in either finding bodies or accounting for the fate of their relatives in the near future. Accordingly,
by applying to the Court in January 1990, these applicants acted, in the special circumstances of their cases, with
reasonable expedition for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.
171. The Court has, in reaching this conclusion, given careful consideration to the respondent Government's
submissions concerning the applications introduced by the families of Turkish Cypriots who went missing during
inter-communal strife in the 1960 (Baybora and Karabardak, cited above). It is particularly sensitive to any
appearance that differing, and inconsistent, approaches have been taken in these cases. Nonetheless, it is not
persuaded that this is so. The Chamber decisions in the aforementioned cases are very concise; and in the absence
of arguments from the parties, there is no explanatory reasoning. Their conclusion, however, that the applications
were introduced out of time is in line with the principles and case-law outlined above. It is not disputed that the
applicants' relatives disappeared or were killed in 1964, that there was no ongoing process of exhaustion of
domestic remedies or other relevant procedures in the following years and that the matter was eventually brought
before the CMP in 1989. However in accordance with the Court's approach above, it must have been apparent
by the end of 1990 that this body could not realistically be expected to bring about any positive results in the
near future. By waiting therefore until 2001, a further period of eleven years, during which there were no intervening
events capable of suspending the running of time, the applicants in those cases had unduly delayed in introducing
their complaints before the Court.
172. The Court rejects the preliminary objection under this head.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION
173. Article 2 of the Convention provides:
"1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime
for which this penalty is provided by law.
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it
results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection."
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A. The Chamber judgment
174. The Chamber found no reason to differ from the conclusion of the Grand Chamber in the fourth inter-
State case, holding that the nine men had disappeared against the same life-threatening background and that while
there might not have been an evidential basis to substantiate that all nine men had been last seen in the custody
of agents of the respondent State, there was an obligation under Article 2 to take due measures to protect the lives
of the wounded, prisoners of war or civilians in zones of international conflict and this extended to providing an
effective investigation for those who disappeared in such circumstances. No effective investigation had been
provided, by the CMP or otherwise.
B. Submissions to the Court
1. The applicants
175. The applicants submitted that the Chamber had correctly applied the findings of the fourth inter-State
case in their own applications. There had been a pressing obligation on the respondent Government to conduct a
prompt, independent, effective and thorough investigation into the fate of the missing men who had disappeared
in life-threatening circumstances during the military operations in which they were last seen and which had been
initiated by the respondent Government. They did not consider that any recent developments as regards the CMP
were relevant, since the exhumations had not concerned them, save very recently in one case, and there was still
no possibility of the CMP investigating effectively the circumstances of any death or disappearance. In.so far as
the remains of Savvas Hadjipanteli (application no. 16071/90) had been discovered, they maintained their arguments
that there had been a violation.
2. The respondent Government
176. The Government submitted that it had not been established that the applicants had been detained by
Turkish authorities and that no liability arose under Article 2. They argued that inter-State applications should be
distinguished from individual applications, being based on different Convention provisions. In the latter, the notion
of victim status was essential, whereas in the former, the applicant State did not have to establish a prima facie
case. The Government considered that the Chamber had failed to apply the burden of proof applicable in individual
cases, that of proof beyond reasonable doubt, but erred in relying on the findings in an inter-State case. The
Commission in its decision on admissibility in these cases had expressed doubt that the first applicants were
covered by the findings in the inter-State case.
177. Even if Article 2 was applicable, the Government considered that they had not failed to comply with its
requirements. They emphasised that the CMP had evolved considerably since the findings in the inter-State case.
It stressed the importance of the project on the exhumation and return of remains, which was giving concrete
results, with financial and practical assistance from both sides, international NGOs and the international community.
They pointed out that, given the Chamber's reliance on the international context of the conflict as relevant to the
nature of the obligations arising under Article 2, it was only logical that the CMP be regarded as an appropriate
remedy against such a historical and political background. It should not be forgotten, in their view, that Turkish
Cypriots had already disappeared in 1963 and the international community had considered the CMP as the
appropriate response to the complex, sensitive and painful situation. This had the advantage of treating the families
on both sides in an equal manner.
3. The Government of Cyprus
178. The Cypriot Government submitted that the burden of proof was the same in inter-State and individual
applications but merely appeared different due to the context. The applicants had provided sufficient evidence that
the missing men were last seen in territory which at the time or immediately afterwards was under the de facto
control of the invading Turkish forces or forces for whom they were responsible. At a time of international armed
conflict, this meant that those men were in a life-threatening situation and it was the responsibility of the Government
in charge of those forces to determine what happened to them. Such responsibility was also imposed by international
humanitarian law, which could be used to clarify the scope of existing Convention obligations. Given that the
men did not make it back to their own lines, they were wounded, sick, dead or detained. The respondent Government
had been under the obligation to seek them out, provide treatment if sick or, in the case of the dead, to bury them;
and in all cases, to provide information about their fate.
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179. While they welcomed any improvement in the functioning of the CMP, the limitations on its terms of
reference, mandate and authority were unchanged; in particular the exclusion of jurisdiction to make findings on
cause of death and responsibility, the confinement of territorial jurisdiction to Cyprus with the exclusion of Turkey,
the promises of impunity to persons who might be responsible and the doubt whether it would investigate Turkish
army or official actions on Cypriot territory.
C. The Court's assessment
180. The Court observes that in the fourth inter-State case the Grand Chamber had to address the issue of the
missing Greek Cypriots as a whole. It found as follows:
"132. The Court recalls that there is no proof that any of the missing persons have been unlawfully
killed. However, in its opinion, and of relevance to the instant case, the above-mentioned procedural
obligation also arises upon proof of an arguable claim that an individual, who was last seen in
the custody of agents of the State, subsequently disappeared in a context which may be considered
life-threatening.
133. Against this background, the Court observes that the evidence bears out the applicant Govern-
ment's claim that many persons now missing were detained either by Turkish or Turkish-Cypriot
forces. Their detention occurred at a time when the conduct of military operations was accompanied
by arrests and killings on a large scale. The Commission correctly described the situation as life-
threatening. The above-mentioned broadcast statement of Mr Denktao and the later report of
Professor Kiigiik, if not conclusive of the respondent State's liability for the death of missing
persons are, at the very least, clear indications of the climate of risk and fear obtaining at the
material time and of the real dangers to which detainees were exposed."
1. The burden of proof
181. The Court notes that the procedural obligation was stated as arising where individuals, last seen in the
custody of agents of the State, subsequently disappeared in a life-threatening context. In the context of the inter-
State case it was not necessary to specify which individuals were included in the "many persons" shown by the
evidence to have been detained by Turkish or Turkish Cypriot forces at the time of their disappearance. There is
no basis on which it can be assumed that the missing men in the present case were included in the Court's findings.
It must therefore be determined in this case whether the conditions for a procedural obligation arose.
182. In response to the respondent Government's argument about the burden of proof, the Court would concur
that the standard of proof generally applicable in individual applications is that of beyond reasonable doubt -
though this also applies equally in inter-State cases (see the Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, pp.
64-65, § 161, Series A no. 25). The burden of proof may be easier to satisfy in practical terms in the inter-State
context where the facts of many incidents and numerous events may be taken into account. But, even in individual
cases, the Court's case-law has identified situations in which the rigour of this rule may be mitigated.
183. Such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of
similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (loc. cit.). Thus, where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part,
within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons within their control in custody, strong
presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries, death or disappearances occurring during such detention. The
burden of proof may then be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing
explanation (Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21896/93, § 100, ECHR 2000-VH; Akdeniz and Others v. Turkey, no.
23954/94, §§ 85-89, 31 May 2000); see also cases short of custody, where it is possible to establish that an
individual entered a place under those authorities' control and has not been seen since, in which circumstances,
the onus is on the Government to provide a plausible explanation of what happened on the premises and to show
that the person concerned was not detained by the authorities, but left the premises without subsequently being
deprived of his or her liberty (e.g. Tanio and Others v. Turkey, no. 65899/01, § 160, ECHR 2005-VIII; Yusupova
and Zaurbekov v. Russia, no. 22057/02, §§ 50-55, 9 October 2008).
184. As a logical development of this approach, in the situation where persons are found injured or dead, or
who have disappeared, in an area within the exclusive control of the authorities of the State and there is prima
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facie evidence that the State may be involved, the burden of proof may also shift to the Government since the
events in issue may lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities. If they then
fail to disclose crucial documents to enable the Court to establish the facts or otherwise provide a satisfactory and
convincing explanation, strong inferences may be drawn (see Akkum v. Turkey, no. 21894/93, § 211, ECHR 2005-
II (extracts); and, amongst many cases concerning the situation in Chechnya, Goygova v. Russia, no. 74240/01,
§§ 88-96, 4 October 2007, and Magomed Musayev and Others v. Russia, no. 8979/02, §§ 85-86, 23 October 2008).
185. Turning to the present case, the Court would note that the respondent Government did not accept that the
missing men had been taken into custody under their responsibility. Nor is it for the Court to seek to establish
what occurred in 1974, which is outside its temporal jurisdiction. However, it is satisfied that there is a strongly
arguable case that two men were last seen in circumstances falling within the control of the Turkish or Turkish
Cypriots forces, namely, Eleftherios Thoma and Savvas Hadjipanteli who were included on an ICRC list as
detainees (see paragraphs 77 and 80 above). As concerns the other seven men, no such documentary evidence of
actual detention has been forthcoming. There is nonetheless an arguable case that the other seven men were last
seen in an area under the control, or about to come under the control of the Turkish armed forces. Whether they
died, in the fighting or of their wounds, or whether they were captured as prisoners, they must still be accounted
for. Article 2 must be interpreted in so far as possible in light of the general principles of international law,
including the rules of international humanitarian law which play an indispensable and universally-accepted role
in mitigating the savagery and inhumanity of armed conflictl 6 (see Loizidou, cited above, § 43). The Court therefore
concurs with the reasoning of the Chamber in holding that in a zone of international conflict Contracting States
are under obligation to protect the lives of those not, or no longer, engaged in hostilities. This would also extend
to the provision of medical assistance to the wounded; where combatants have died, or succumbed to wounds,
the need for accountability would necessitate proper disposal of remains and require the authorities to collect and
provide information about the identity and fate of those concerned, or permit bodies such as the ICRC to do so.
186. In the present case, the respondent Government have not put forward any materials or concrete information
that would show that any of the missing men were found dead or were killed in the conflict zone under their
control. Nor is there any other convincing explanation as to what might have happened to them that might counter
the applicants' claims that the men disappeared in areas under the respondent Government's exclusive control. In
light of the findings in the fourth inter-State case, which have not been controverted, these disappearances occurred
in life-threatening circumstances where the conduct of military operations was accompanied by widespread arrests
and killings. Article 2 therefore imposes a continuing obligation on the respondent Government to account for the
whereabouts and fate of the missing men in the present case; if warranted, consequent measures for redress could
then be effectively adopted.
2. Compliance with the procedural obligation
187. The Court recalls that in the fourth inter-State case the Grand Chamber found as follows:
"134. ...The Court cannot but note that the authorities of the respondent State have never undertaken
any investigation into the claims made by the relatives of the missing persons that the latter had
disappeared after being detained in circumstances in which there was real cause to fear for their
welfare. It must be noted in this connection that there was no official follow-up to Mr Denktao's
alarming statement. No attempt was made to identify the names of the persons who were reportedly
released from Turkish custody into the hands of Turkish-Cypriot paramilitaries or to inquire into
the whereabouts of the places where the bodies were disposed of. It does not appear either that
any official inquiry was made into the claim that Greek-Cypriot prisoners were transferred to
Turkey.
135. The Court agrees with the applicant Government that the respondent State's procedural
obligation at issue cannot be discharged through its contribution to the investigatory work of the
CMP. Like the Commission, the Court notes that, although the CMP's procedures are undoubtedly
useful for the humanitarian purpose for which they were established, they are not of themselves
sufficient to meet the standard of an effective investigation required by Article 2 of the Convention,
especially in view of the narrow scope of that body's investigations (see paragraph 27 above).
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136. Having regard to the above considerations, the Court concludes that there has been a continuing
violation of Article 2 on account of the failure of the authorities of the respondent State to conduct
an effective investigation aimed at clarifying the whereabouts and fate of Greek-Cypriot missing
persons who disappeared in life-threatening circumstances."
188. The respondent Government's arguments effectively invited the Court to reconsider the above finding as
to the ineffectiveness of the CMP in providing a proper investigation into the fate of the missing men. They
asserted that due account should be taken of the extremely sensitive and painful context in which the international
community have considered it appropriate to provide for a bi-communal mechanism. They also argued that the
terms of reference of the CMP should not be regarded as decisive but that the spectacular re-activation of its
activities, and its recent achievements in locating and identifying remains should be given overriding weight.
189. The Court considers, firstly, that the Grand Chamber in the fourth inter-State case was fully aware of the
background and sensitivity of the situation when it found the CMP's procedures did not meet the standard of
investigation required by Article 2. As concerns the second strand of argument, it fully acknowledges the importance
of the CMP's ongoing exhumations and identifications of remains and gives full credit to the work being done
in providing information and returning remains to relatives (see also the Committee of Ministers' decision at
paragraph 88 above). But important though these measures are as a first step in the investigative process, they do
not exhaust the obligation under Article 2.
190. From the materials provided as regards Savvas Hadjipanteli, it appears that on identification of remains
the procedure is to issue a medical certificate of death, which in brief terms indicates the injuries noted as causing
death - in his case the presence of various bullet wounds. There is however no report analysing the circumstances
or even the dating of death. Nor have any investigative measures been taken to locate or question any witnesses
in the area who could give information as to how Savvas Hadjipanteli and the others found with him in the mass
grave came to meet their end and at whose hands. Thus, even though the location of the body of Savvas Hadjipanteli
has been established it cannot be said, putting supposition and speculation aside, that any clear light has been
shed as to how he met his fate.
191. The Court does not doubt that many years after the events there would be considerable difficulty in
assembling eye-witness evidence or in identifying and mounting a case against any alleged perpetrators. However,
the Court's case-law on the ambit of the procedural obligation is unambiguous. The essential purpose of such
investigation is to secure the effective implementation of the domestic laws which protect the right to life and, in
those cases involving State agents or bodies, to ensure their accountability for deaths occurring under their
responsibility. Even where there may be obstacles which prevent progress in an investigation in a particular
situation, a prompt response by the authorities is vital in maintaining public confidence in their adherence to the
rule of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts (see McKerr v. the
United Kingdom, no. 28883/95, §§ 111 and 114, ECHR 2001-HI; and Brecknell v. the United Kingdom, no. 32457/
04, § 65, 27 November 2007). Besides being independent, accessible to the victim's family, carried out with
reasonable promptness and expedition and affording a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation
or its results, the investigation must also be effective in the sense that it is capable of leading to a determination
of whether the death was caused unlawfully and if so, to the identification and punishment of those responsible
( see Ogur v. Turkey [GC], no. 21594/93, § 88, ECHR 1999-Ill; Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom, no. 24746/
94, H§ 105-109, 4 May 2001; and Douglas-Williams v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 56413/00, 8 January 2002).
192. The Court finds no indication that the CMP is going beyond its limited terms of reference to play any
role in determining the facts surrounding the deaths of the missing persons who have been identified or in collecting
or assessing evidence with a view to holding any perpetrators of unlawful violence to account in a criminal
prosecution. Nor is any other body or authority taking on that role. It may be that investigations would prove
inconclusive, or insufficient evidence would be available. However, that outcome is not inevitable even. at this
late stage and the respondent Government cannot be absolved from making the requisite efforts. By way of
example, the Court recalls that in the context of Northern Ireland the authorities have provided for investigative
bodies (variously, the Serious Crimes Review Team and Historical Enquiry Team) to review the files on past
sectarian murders and unsolved killings and to assess the availability of any new evidence and the feasibility of
further investigative measures; in cases before the Court, these measures were found, given the time that had
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elapsed, to have been adequate in the particular circumstances (see Brecknell, cited above, §§ 71, 75, 79-81). It
cannot therefore be said that there is nothing further that could be done.
193. It may be that both sides in this conflict prefer not to attempt to bring out to the light of day the reprisals,
extra-judicial killings and massacres that took place or to identify those amongst their own forces and citizens
who were implicated. It may be that they prefer a "politically-sensitive" approach to the missing persons problem
and that the CMP with its limited remit was the only solution which could be agreed under the brokerage of the
UN. That can have no bearing on the application of the provisions of the Convention.
194. The Court concludes that there has been a continuing violation of Article 2 on account of the failure of
the respondent State to provide for an effective investigation aimed at clarifying the fate of the nine men who
went missing in 1974.
IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
195. Article 3 provides:
"No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."
A. The Chamber judgment
196. Referring to the fourth inter-State case, the Chamber found also a violation of Article 3 as regards the
inhuman treatment suffered by the applicant relatives due to the years of silence concerning the missing men.
B. Submissions to the Court
1. The applicants
197. The applicants adopted the reasoning of the Chamber, emphasising that the second applicants had been
without news of the loved ones for 34 years, suffering daily anguish and distress, exacerbated by recent newspaper
reports that some missing persons had been used as guinea pigs in Turkish army biochemical laboratories.
2. The respondent Government
198. The Government submitted that none of the missing men had been subjected to forcible detention and
that no issue arose.
3. The Government of Cyprus
199. The Cypriot Government submitted that the applicants had been victims of continuing inhuman treatment.
They had all been wives or parents of the missing men; in three cases, following the death of the parent, the sister
or brother of the missing person had taken over the application. They had never given up trying to find out what
had happened and their anguish was worsened by the fact that there were people with information who were not
revealing what they knew.
C. The Court's assessment
200. The phenomenon of disappearances imposes a particular burden on the relatives of missing persons who
are kept in ignorance of the fate of their loved ones and suffer the anguish of uncertainty. Thus the Court's case-
law recognised from very early on that the situation of the relatives may disclose inhuman and degrading treatment
contrary to Article 3. The essence of the violation is not that there has been a serious human rights violation
concerning the missing person; it lies in the authorities' reactions and attitudes to the situation when it has been
brought to their attention (see, amongst many authorities, Orhan v. Turkey, no. 25656/94, § 358, 18 June 2002,
and Imakayeva, cited above, § 164). Other relevant factors include the proximity of the family tie, the particular
circumstances of the relationship, the extent to which the family member witnessed the events in question, the
involvement of the family member in the attempts to obtain information about the disappeared person (Taniu,
cited above, § 219). The finding of such a violation is not limited to cases where the respondent State has been
held responsible for the disappearance (see Osmanoglu, cited above, § 96) but can arise where the failure of the
authorities to respond to the quest for information by the relatives or the obstacles placed in their way, leaving
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them to bear the brunt of the efforts to uncover any facts, may be regarded as disclosing a flagrant, continuous
and callous disregard of an obligation to account for the whereabouts and fate of a missing person.
201. The Court notes that in the fourth inter-State case the Grand Chamber found that in the context of the
disappearances in 1974, where the military operation resulted in considerable loss of life, large-scale arrests and
detentions and enforced separations of families, the relatives of the missing men had suffered the agony of not
knowing whether their family member had been killed in the conflict or had been taken into detention and, due
to the continuing division of Cyprus, had been faced with very serious obstacles in their search for information.
The silence of the authorities of the respondent State in face of the real concerns of the relatives could only be
categorised as inhuman treatment (at § 157).
202. The Court finds no basis on which it can differ from this finding in the present case. The length of time
over which the ordeal of the relatives has been dragged out and the attitude of official indifference in face of their
acute anxiety to know the fate of their close family members discloses a situation attaining the requisite level of
severity. There has, accordingly, been a breach of Article 3 in respect of the applicants.
V. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION
203. Article 5 of the Convention provides, as relevant:
"1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty
save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non- compliance with the lawful order of a court
or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the
competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is
reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done
so; ...
2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of
the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him.
3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this
Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise
judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial.
Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings
by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release
ordered if the detention is not lawful.
5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of
this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation."
A. The Chamber judgment
204. The Chamber, citing the fourth inter-State case, found a breach of Article 5 by virtue of the failure of
the authorities to provide an effective investigation into the whereabouts of the nine missing men in respect of
whom there was an arguable claim that they had been deprived of their liberty at the time of their disappearance.
B. Submissions to the Court
205. The applicants claimed that a procedural violation arose as all the missing men were last seen alive in an area
which, upon their disappearance, or immediately thereafter, came under the control of the respondent Government. A
presumption had been created that the men had been detained or come under the control of the Turkish army or
forces for which they were responsible, rendering the respondent Government responsible for their fate and putting
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them under an obligation to account for them and carry out a prompt, effective, independent and thorough
investigation.
206. The Government submitted that none of the missing men had been taken, or remained, in custody and
that the allegations of the applicants were purely hypothetical. There was nothing to suggest, and it was extremely
illogical to assume, that any missing Greek Cypriot was still detained by Turkish or Turkish-Cypriot authorities.
207. The Cypriot Government contended that there was proof beyond reasonable doubt that two of the missing
men, Thoma and Hadjipanteli, were detained by Turkey. The Turkish authorities had, however, failed to provide
a credible and convincing account of what had happened to them; there had been no proper official records or
system in place for such, nor any prompt or effective investigation. This disclosed numerous continuing violations
of Article 5; and in their submission the failure of the Turkish authorities to acknowledge the detention rendered
them in breach of Article 5 notwithstanding the inability of any applicant to raise the issue before the Court.
C. The Court's assessment
208. The Court recalls that it has found above that there was a prima facie or arguable case that two of the
men were last seen in circumstances falling within the control of the Turkish or Turkish Cypriot forces, namely,
Eleftherios Thoma and Savvas Hadjipanteli who were included on ICRC lists as detainees (see paragraphs 77 and
80 above). They have not been seen since. However, the Turkish authorities have not acknowledged their detention;
they have not provided any documentary evidence giving official trace of their movements. The Court notes the
patent disregard of the procedural safeguards applicable to the detention of persons. While there is no evidence
that any of the missing persons were still in detention in the period under the Court's consideration, it remains
incumbent on the Turkish Government to show that they have since carried out an effective investigation into the
arguable claim that the two missing men had been taken into custody and not seen subsequently (see, amongst
many authorities, Kurt, cited above, § 124). The Court's findings above in relation to Article 2 leave no doubt
that the authorities have also failed to conduct the requisite investigation in that regard. This discloses a continuing
violation of Article 5.
209. No sufficient evidential basis arising in respect of the other seven missing men, no violation of Article 5
is disclosed in that connection.
VI. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 13 AND 14 OF THE CONVENTION
210. The applicants originally invoked Articles 4 (prohibition of slavery and forced labour), 6 (right to fair
trial), 8 (right to respect for family and private life), 10 (freedom of expression), 12 (the right to marry and found
a family), 13 (effective remedy for arguable Convention breaches) and 14 (prohibition of discrimination in enjoyment
of Convention rights). In their most recent submissions, they have maintained their complaints on the above, save
for Article 4.
211. Having regard to the facts of the case, the submissions of the parties and its findings under Articles 2, 3
and 5 of the Convention, the Court considers that it has examined the main legal questions raised in the present
application and that there is no need to give a separate ruling on the applicants' remaining complaints.
VII. APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 46 AND 41 OF THE CONVENTION
212. Article 46 provides:
"1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any
case to which they are parties.
2. The final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall
supervise its execution."
213. Article 41 provides:
"If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and
if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be
made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party."
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A. Damage
1. The Chamber judgment
214. The Chamber found no basis for an award of pecuniary damage. It declined to grant the applicants' very
high claims in respect of non-pecuniary damage, emphasising that Article 41 did not provide for imposing punitive
sanctions on respondent Governments. It gave weight to the context in which some 1,400 Greek Cypriots and 500
Turkish Cypriots had gone missing and to the fact the Committee of Ministers was in the process of monitoring
the execution of the judgment in the fourth inter-State case, in which respect the crucial element would be the
provision, finally, of measures to cast light on the fate of as many of the missing men, women and children as
possible. It concluded that in these unique circumstances it would be neither appropriate or constructive, or even
just, to make additional specific awards or recommendations in regard to individual applicants. The finding of
violations was thus considered to constitute in itself sufficient just satisfaction.
2. Submissions to the Court
a. The applicants' claims
215. The applicants submitted that Turkey's continued unwillingness to abide by her obligations were in breach
of Article 46; this affected hundreds of Greek Cypriot families and threatened the effectiveness of the Convention
system; they urged the Court to direct the Government to conform with its legal obligations under Articles 2, 3,
5, 8, 10, 13 and 14 of the Convention towards the applicants by conducting a prompt and effective investigation
into the fate and whereabouts of the missing men, publicising the results, immediately and unconditionally releasing
and repatriating any still in Turkish custody and returning the remains of those who were proved to be dead. In
default of such steps, as incentive, the Government should pay each applicant 24 Cypriot pounds (CYP) per day,
such rate doubling for every twelve month period that elapsed.
216. For non-pecuniary damage, the applicants claimed under this head 407,550 euros (EUR) in respect of the
violations suffered by each of the missing men, such sums to be held by the applicants on their behalf and the
behalf of their heirs; and EUR 543,400 for each of the applicants or their successors (namely EUR 6,175 for every
year of violation between 1987-2009 in respect of each violation). Such compensation was essential, in their
submission, as the violations were numerous and grave, had continued for over 34 years, were massive and systemic
and were aggravated by blatant disregard of the findings of the Convention organs. The Chamber, in not making
an award, was, they respectfully submitted, in error, and acting in a discriminatory manner inconsistent with the
Court's practice.
b. The respondent Government's response
217. Concerning non-pecuniary damage, the respondent Government considered that it was inappropriate to
make any award as the allegations were basically presumptive, there being no corroboration in the CMP files that
the men were taken into custody and all but one of them had gone missing in a situation of conflict which inevitably
entailed a certain risk to life. They also submitted that there had been substantial progress in the activities of the
CMP and that as the issue of disappearances concerned both communities, awards to Greek Cypriot families would
deepen the wounds of Turkish Cypriot families with missing relatives and not help in the process of conciliation.
Further, the damages claimed were excessively and unprecedentedly high.
c. The intervening Government's comments
218. The intervening Government argued that the Court should identify the measures to be taken to put an end
to the continuing violations, which goal could not be met merely by reparation. Reparation should be made available
in the form of compensation. In not awarding such damages, the Chamber had departed from constant practice
in disappearance cases. The fourth inter-State case was not relevant as it was not known if compensation could,
or would, be awarded. Awards should take into account previous awards and the length of time over which the
violations have lasted.
219. They requested that the Court require the Turkish Government to conduct an effective investigation into
the fate of the missing persons, specifying what was required, and to take measures to prevent the occurrence of
disappearances and threats to the right to life contrary to Articles 2 and 5.
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d. Submissions by Redress
220. Redress, an international non-governmental organisation, submitted that as a matter of general public
international law the finding of a breach gives rise to an obligation to make reparation. In disappearance cases,
the goal was restitutio in integrum and, where that was not possible, compensation and other adequate and
appropriate forms of reparation were considered. Compensation should be proportional to the gravity of the violation
and the circumstances of the case. They also submitted that, in line with this Court's case-law, an effective remedy
required an effective investigation into the matter, while the International Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance provided that measures be taken to enable victims to know the truth
regarding the circumstances of the disappearance. In disappearance cases, the Inter-American Court had ordered
the exhumation and return of the body, as well as damages for moral suffering, an investigation into the circumstances
and publication of the facts of the case. The right to know the truth was also recognised by the UN Human Rights
Committee. A number of treaty texts and judgments referred to the need for special steps to end ongoing and
continuing violations and to guarantee against non-recurrence.
221. They noted that the Court had awarded compensation in most, if not all, disappearance cases and had
held under Article 13 that in the case of breaches of Articles 2 and 3 compensation should in principle be available.
The 'duration of breaches was relevant to assessing damages. The prospect of general measures being ordered did
not remove the obligation to give individual reparation. It was also open to the Court in an individual case to
specify additional forms of just satisfaction to put an end to existing violations and prevent recurrence.
3. The Court's assessment
a. Article 46 of the Convention
222. As regards the applicants' views concerning the provision of an effective investigation, the Court reiterates
the general principle that the respondent State remains free to choose the means by which it will discharge its
legal obligation under Article 46 of the Convention, provided that such means are compatible with the conclusions
set out in the Court's judgment (see Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy [GC], nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98, § 249, ECHR
2000-VIH; and Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], no. 55707/00, § 110, ECHR 2009-...). Consequently it considers that
in these applications it falls to the Committee of Ministers acting under Article 46 of the Convention to address
the issues as to what may be required in practical terms by way of compliance (see, mutatis mutandis, Akdivar
and Others v. Turkey (Article 50), 1 April 1998, pp. 723-24, § 47, Reports 1998-II).
223. In so far as the applicants suggested that daily fines be imposed on the Government until they finally
comply with the Court's judgments, the Court has consistently rejected claims for punitive damages (see Akdivar
and Others, cited above, § 38, Orhan, cited above, § 448). It considers there to be little, if any, scope under the
Convention for directing Governments to pay penalties to applicants which are unconnected with damage shown
to be actually incurred in respect of past violations of the Convention; in so far as such sums would purport to
compensate for future suffering of the applicants, this would be speculative in the extreme.
b. Article 41 of the Convention
224. The Court would observe that there is no express provision for non-pecuniary or moral damage. Evolving
case by case, the Court's approach in awarding just satisfaction has distinguished situations where the applicant
has suffered evident trauma, whether physical or psychological, pain and suffering, distress, anxiety, frustration,
feelings of injustice or humiliation, prolonged uncertainty, disruption to life, or real loss of opportunity (e.g. Elsholz
v. Germany [GC], no. 25735/94, § 70, ECHR 2000-VIII; Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, § 123, ECHR
1999-V; and Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom (just satisfaction), nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, § 12, ECHR
2000-IX) and those situations where the public vindication of the wrong suffered by the applicant, in a judgment
binding on the Contracting State, is a powerful form of redress in itself. In many cases where a law, procedure
or practice has been found to fall short of Convention standards this is enough to put matters right (see, for
example, Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28957/95, § 120, ECHR 2002-VI; Saadi v. Italy
[GC], no. 37201/06, § 188, ECHR 2008-...; S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 30562/04 and 30566/
04, § 134, 4 December 2008). In some situations, however, the impact of the violation may be regarded as being
of a nature and degree as to have impinged so significantly on the moral well-being of the applicant as to require
something further. Such elements do not lend themselves to a process of calculation or precise quantification. Nor
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is it the Court's role to function akin to a domestic tort mechanism court in apportioning fault and compensatory
damages between civil parties. Its guiding principle is equity, which above all involves flexibility and an objective
consideration of what is just, fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case, including not only the
position of the applicant but the overall context in which the breach occurred. Its non-pecuniary awards serve to
give recognition to the fact that moral damage occurred as a result of a breach of a fundamental human right and
reflect in the broadest of terms the severity of the damage; they are not, nor should they be, intended to give
financial comfort or sympathetic enrichment at the expense of the Contracting Party concerned.
225. It is therefore not the case that there are specific scales of damages that should be awarded in disappearance
cases as the applicants have sought to deduce from the past cases involving disappearances in Russia and Turkey.
Neither can the Court agree that the Chamber erred in taking into account the background of the case and the
ongoing executions process before the Committee of Ministers. As the applicants' own submissions make plain,
their principal concern is for the uncertainty to be brought to an end by the provision of information about what
happened to their relatives so long ago. That said, the applicants have endured decades of not knowing which
must have marked them profoundly. Given the grievous nature of the case and making an assessment on an
equitable basis, the Court awards the sum of EUR 12,000 for non-pecuniary damage to each of the nine applicants,
to be held by the heirs where the applicant has deceased.
B. Costs and expenses
1. The parties' submissions
226. The representatives for the applicants Andreas and Giorghulla Varnava (no. 16064/90), Demetris Theochar-
ides and the heirs of Elli Theocharidou (no. 16068/90), Eleftherios and the heirs of Christos Thoma (no. 16070/
90), Savvas and Georghios Apostolides (no. 16072/90) and Leontis Demetriou and Yianoulla Leonti Sarma (no.
16073/90) claimed CYP 5,778.41 inclusive of value-added tax (VAT) for each of the applications for costs and
expenses prior to referral to the Grand Chamber, plus EUR 6,299.58, inclusive of VAT for costs before the Grand
Chamber. This made a total per application of EUR 16,172.58.
227. The representatives for Andreas Loizides and the heirs of Loizos Loizides (no. 16065/90), Philippos
Constantinou and Demetris K. Peyiotis (no. 16066/90) Panicos and Chrysoula Charalambous (no. 16069/90) and
Savvas and Androula Hadjipanteli (no. 16071/90) provided bills of costs in the amounts of CYP 5,186.16 inclusive
of VAT per application for costs and expenses prior to referral to the Grand Chamber and EUR 6,299.58 inclusive
of VAT per application for costs before the Grand Chamber. This made a total per application of EUR 14,960.66.
228. The respondent Government stated that these claims were exaggerated and excessive. The applications
were all of a similar nature and the submissions contained profuse citations and reproduction of earlier material.
2. The Court's award
229. The Court recalls that costs and expenses will not be awarded under Article 41 unless it is established
that they were actually incurred, were necessarily incurred and were also reasonable as to quantum. Furthermore,
legal costs are only recoverable in so far as they relate to the violation found (see, for example, Beyeler v. Italy
(just satisfaction) [GC], no. 33202/96, § 27, 28 May 2002, Sahin v. Germany [GC], no. 30943/96, § 105, ECHR
2003-VIII).
230. Noting that the applicants' submissions were almost entirely identical and that not all the claimed violations
were upheld, but taking into account the length of time over which the applications have been pending before the
Convention organs and the multiple rounds of written submissions, the Court awards EUR 8,000 per application
for costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants on such amount.
C. Default interest
231. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate
of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
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FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1.' Dismisses by sixteen votes to one the Government's preliminary objections as to lack of legal interest;
2. Dismisses by sixteen votes to one the Government's preliminary objection as to lack of temporal jurisdiction;
3. Dismisses by fifteen votes to two the Government's preliminary objection as to the six-month rule;
4. Holds by sixteen votes to one that there has been a continuing violation of Article 2 of the Convention on
account of the failure of the authorities of the respondent State to conduct an effective investigation into the fate
of the nine men who disappeared in life-threatening circumstances;
5. Holds by sixteen votes to one that there has been a continuing violation of Article 3 of the Convention in
respect of the applicants;
6. Holds by sixteen votes to one that there has been a continuing violation of Article 5 of the Convention by
virtue of the failure of the authorities of the respondent State to conduct an effective investigation into the fate
of Eleftherios Thoma and Savvas Hadjipanteli;
7. Holds unanimously that there has been no continuing violation of Article 5 of the Convention by virtue of
the failure of the authorities of the respondent State to conduct an effective investigation into the fate of the other
seven missing men;
8. Holds unanimously that it is not necessary to examine the complaints under Articles 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 13 and
14 of the Convention;
9. Holds by sixteen votes to one
(a) that the respondent State is to pay, within three months, the following amounts:
(i) EUR 12,000 (twelve thousand euros) per application, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in
respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 8,000 (eight thousand euros) per application, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the
applicants or their heirs, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall
be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
10. Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the applicants' claims for just satisfaction.
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg,
on 18 September 2009.
Erik Fribergh Jean-Paul Costa
Registrar President
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the following
separate opinions are annexed to this judgment:
(a) Concurring opinion of Judges Spielmann, joined by Judges Ziemele and Kalaydjeva;
(b) Joint concurring opinion of Judges Spielmann and Power;
(c) Concurring opinion of Judge Ziemele;
(d) Concurring opinion of Judge Villiger;
(e) Dissenting opinion of Judge Eronen.
J.-P.C.
E.F.
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CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE SPIELMANN, JOINED BY JUDGES ZIEMELE
AND KALAYDJIEVA
1. The Court has decided that there has been a continuing violation of Article 2 of the Convention on account
of the failure of the authorities of the respondent State to conduct an effective investigation into the fate of the
nine men who disappeared in life-threatening circumstances. I regret that in the judgment and the operative part
the Court declined to indicate explicitly that the respondent State should conduct an effective investigation.
2. It is in my view regrettable that the Court decided that it falls to the Committee of Ministers to indicate
what may be required in practical terms by way of compliance.
3. In consistency with the principle of restitutio in integrum, spelled out eloquently in the submissions by the
Redress Trust (paragraph 220 of the judgment), and by emphasising the obligation, for the State found in breach
of the Convention, to re-establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed, the Court
should have indicated, in the reasoning and the operative part of the judgment, that an effective investigation into
the matter should be held. Accountability for the fate of the missing men includes carrying out an investigation
into the events and those responsible and offering the possibility of claiming redress to the victims and the relatives.
4. In paragraph 191 of the judgment, the Court emphasises that the Court's case-law on the ambit of the
procedural obligation is unambiguous and that the essential purpose of such investigation is to secure the effective
implementation of the domestic laws which protect the right to life and, in those cases involving State agents or
bodies, to ensure their accountability for deaths occurring under their responsibility. This general principle, drawn
from the Court's case-law, should have been reflected in paragraph 222 and in the operative part of the judgment.
5. By virtue of Article 46 § 2 of the Convention, supervision of the execution of the Court's judgments is the
responsibility of the Committee of Ministers. That does not mean, however, that the Court should not play any
part in the matter and should not take measures designed to facilitate the Committee of Ministers' task in discharging
these functions.
6. Indeed, the Court has held in the past that a violation of Article 2 cannot be remedied exclusively through
an award of damages to the relatives of the victim (Kaya v. Turkey, 19 February 1998, § 105, Reports of Judgments
and Decisions 1998-1). As the Redress Trust eloquently emphasised in its observations, given the fundamental
importance of the right to protection of life, in addition to any compensatory award, there is an obligation on
states to carry out a thorough and effective investigation likely to lead to those responsible being identified and
punished, and in which the complainant has effective access to the investigation proceedings (Qakict v. Turkey
[GC], no. 23657/94, §§ 112-113, ECHR 1999-IV). An effective remedy entails the duty to conduct an effective
official investigation into the incident(s), which must be, inter alia, "thorough, impartial and careful." (Velikova
v. Bulgaria, no. 41488/98, § 80, ECHR 2000-VI).
7. To that end, it is essential that in its judgments the Court should not merely give as precise a description
as possible of the nature of the Convention violation found but should also indicate to the State concerned in the
reasoning under Article 46 of the Convention and in the operative provisions, if the circumstances of the case so
require, the measures it considers most appropriate in order to secure redress for the violation.
JOINT CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGES SPIELMANN AND POWER
1. We share the opinion of the majority that there has been a continuing violation of Article 2 of the Convention
on account of the failure of the authorities of the respondent State to conduct an effective investigation into the
fate of the nine men who disappeared in life-threatening circumstances. However, we would like to express our
disagreement as to the reasoning concerning the question of the six months rule. We agree in this respect with
the analysis presented by Judge Ziemele and, in particular, the reference to the general principles of international
law as set out in Article 14.2 of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility.
2. Admittedly, it is quite understandable that the Court wants to uphold some legal certainty when it comes to
the time frames within which complaints can be lodged. Even though we agree as a matter of principle that "where
disappearances are concerned, applicants cannot wait indefinitely before coming to Strasbourg" and that they
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"must make proof of a certain amount of diligence and initiative and introduce their complaints without delay"
(paragraph 161), we should still not forget that we are dealing with a continuing violation of an international
obligation and that the respondent State has never accounted for the fate of the missing men, carried out an
investigation into the events and those responsible and offered the possibility of claiming redress to the victims
and the relatives. As the Court rightly points out in paragraph 148 "...the procedural obligation will, potentially,
persist as long as the fate of the person is unaccounted for; the ongoing failure to provide the requisite investigation
will be regarded as a continuing violation (see the fourth inter-State case, § 136)...."
3. To justify the reasoning as to the six months rule, the majority relies heavily on the fact that the United
Nations Committee on Missing Persons (the "CMP") was not effective. We are unable to accept the consequences
of that ineffectiveness as regards the application of the six months rule. In this respect we agree with Judge
Ziemele's observations concerning the limited mandate of the CMP and we share her view that the fact that the
CMP was not effective is only one of a number of criteria (and far from the most relevant one) in deciding on
the application or not of the six months rule in the proceedings before the Court.
4. We would like to add the following. As the Grand Chamber is not bound by the precedents of Baybora and
Karabardak ((decs), nos. 77116/01 and 76575/01, 22 October 2002), we fail to see why the majority felt obliged
to distinguish the present case from the ones decided in 2002 by saying that the applicants in those two cases
"had unduly delayed in introducing their complaints before the Court." We believe that it was unnecessary to
elaborate a specific reasoning emphasising distinguishing features of the Baybora and Karabardak cases, which
concerned applications introduced by the families of Turkish Cypriots who had gone missing during inter-communal
strife in the 1960s. In paragraph 171 the majority concedes that "[t]he Chamber decisions in the aforementioned
cases are very concise; and in the absence of arguments from the parties, there is no explanatory reasoning." In
such circumstances, we are unable to subscribe to the finding that in Baybora and Karabardak the applicants
"had unduly delayed in introducing their complaints before the Court."
5. In the absence of detailed arguments submitted by the parties, we regret that the Karabardak and Baybora
applications were rejected under Article 35 for being introduced out of time and that the Court held in those two
cases that "even assuming that the applicants had no effective remedies as alleged, they must be considered to
have been aware of this long before 30 October 2001, the date on which they introduced their application." We
cannot agree to the justification of those two inadmissibility decisions set out in paragraph 171 by taking as the
critical moment "the end of 1990." In this respect, we are convinced - even if we come to a different conclusion -
by the reasoning of Judge Eronen that "[l]egally there is no difference between the delays of the Karabardak
applicants and the present applicants in their applications to the Court and the Commission, respectively."
6. A continuing violation such as occurs when a State fails to investigate or account for enforced disappearances
does not cease by the passage of time to be a continuing violation. In our view, Judge Ziemele is correct in
observing that the non-application of the six months rule to breaches of international obligations that have a
continuing character, such as in the context of enforced disappearance, serves the important purpose of preventing
the perpetrators from enjoying impunity for such acts.
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE ZIEMELE
1. I agree with all the Court's findings in this case. However, there are a few questions that the Court leaves
open in its reasoning or where I take a different line of reasoning. The first concerns the standing of the missing
men in the proceedings before the Court (§§ 111-113). The second concerns the presumption of death (§§ 142-
146). The third and last is the question of the application of the six months rule to continuing violations, especially
where enforced disappearances are concerned. It should be stated at the beginning that all these questions are
interlinked. I shall now accordingly address the three issues.
The status of the missing men
2. With reference to the existing case-law the Court points out that normally the relatives of the disappeared
person are named as applicants in cases before the Court (§ 111). In the instant case the applications are lodged
in the name of the disappeared persons and their relatives and there is an explicit refusal of the relatives to accept
that a presumption of death may apply to the disappeared persons. Furthermore, the applicants do not allege a
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violation of the substantive aspect of Article 2 of the Convention (see, a contrario, the case-law regarding
disappearances in Chechnya (Russia)).
3. In its judgment, the Court establishes that the obligation to account for the fate of the missing men and
bring to justice the person or persons responsible is of a continuing character (see, e.g. § 148). In my view, from
that it follows that for as long as the fate of the missing men is not known it would be contrary to the very nature
of a particular continuing obligation if the Court were to accept that they could be presumed dead, in which case
the relevant legal consequences would include their lack of standing before the Court.
4. Moreover, enforced disappearances are a particular phenomenon which can only be fully addressed if it is
recognized that it violates at the same time several human rights (for definition of the phenomenon, see, e.g., the
UN Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearances, § 89). These rights are perhaps
not all specifically spelled out in the Convention but they may be implied in other concepts contained therein.
Among the rights violated in situations of enforced disappearances is the right to be recognised as a person before
the law. By not accepting the applicant status of the missing men, the Court itself may appear to refuse to recognise
these individuals as persons before the law and to limit their right of access to justice. It is clear to me that the
Court should not only have left the question of the standing of missing men open but it should have clearly
recognised them as applicants in the case.
Presumption of death
5. It is also important to note that international recognition of the acts of enforced disappearance as a continuing
offence for as long as the perpetrators continue to conceal the fate and whereabouts of the missing persons is
aimed at deterring States from engaging in such practices. Within this broader aim it has been recognised at the
UN level that the presumption of death cannot be applied over the objections of the family (§ 90). History shows
that missing persons are being found decades after international conflicts and that the families have continued to
hope and search for their loved ones.
6. It has to be noted that in the instant case, unlike the position in many cases arising from the conflict in
Chechnya (Russia) and that the Court uses as the main source for the principles to be applied in the instant case,
the relatives have not asked either domestic authorities or the Court to rule one way or another on whether the
missing men are dead (for comparison, see Askharova v. Russia, no. 13566/02, § 59, 4 December 2008, and
Magomadova v. Russia, no. 2393/05, 18 June 2009). It is the respondent Government, again unlike the position
in the Russian cases, who invoke the presumption of death so as to argue that the events fall outside the scope
of the Court's temporal jurisdiction. The Russian cases very clearly differ from the instant case in that even the
date of the presumed death falls within the temporal jurisdiction of the Court and the question of a substantive
violation of Article 2 arises. Typically in these cases there is relatively much more, and more recent, evidence as
to the actual event of abduction.
7. I therefore do not share the Court's reasoning in the instant case that the lapse of over 34 years may provide
strong circumstantial evidence that the missing men have died in the meantime (§ 146). Certainly the Russian case-
law does not constitute authority for such a statement of principle. In our case, the applicants refuse to accept any
presumption of death while the respondent Government invokes this argument. At the same time, the applicants
do not raise the claim under the substantive aspect of Article 2 in the context of which, in my view, this disagreement
is more logically situated. The language of § 146 may give a wrong idea of the Court's approach regarding long-
term enforced disappearances typically associated with complex international conflicts. The Court arrived at the
conclusion that, even though the missing men may be presumed dead, a continuing obligation to investigate their
fate and account for their whereabouts persists. I find it difficult to see how one can meaningfully separate the
obligation from those in whom the right is vested, i.e., the missing men. Therefore, given what enforced disappear-
ances represent on the day of lodging the application with the Court, the missing men could not be presumed
dead since there were no national decisions or relatives' requests to that effect. The missing men are the applicants
and there are rights under the Convention owed to them by the respondent State.
Six months rule
8. Lastly, I should address the question of the six months rule. It is quite understandable that the Court wants
to uphold some legal certainty when it comes to the time frames within which complaints can be lodged. Cut-off
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dates serve their legitimate purpose in judicial proceedings. However, the question in our case is whether the same
approach applies where a continuing violation of an international obligation is concerned. For the purposes of this
question, it is important to remind ourselves of the very character of a continuing violation of an international
obligation. Article 14 § 2 of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts defines the phenomenon as follows: "The breach of an international obligation by
an act of a State having a continuing character extends over the entire period during which the act continues and
remains not in conformity with the international obligation".
9. In our case, the respondent State has not to date accounted for the fate of the missing men, conducted an
investigation into the events and those responsible and offered the possibility of claiming redress to the victims
and the relatives. The fact that the United Nations Committee on Missing Persons (CMP) was not effective is
only one, and far from the most relevant, criterion for the decision whether or not to apply the six months rule
in the current proceedings before the Court. The CMP's mandate is limited to ascertaining whether the disappeared
persons are dead or alive. It cannot attribute responsibility or state the cause of death (§ 85). In other words, it
is not the CMP which will discharge the full scope of Turkish obligations with respect to the missing persons.
This was a known fact when the CMP was set up. It was confirmed in the fourth inter-State case (§ 187).
10. The Court took a false route in its reasoning on the six months rule when it stated that from the moment
when it became clear that the CMP would not offer hope for progress (§ 170) the sixth months count should have
begun for the individuals concerned for the purposes of lodging a complaint with the Court. As the judgment
shows (see arguments of the parties under Article 2), and in view of the findings of the Court with respect to a
continuing breach of a procedural obligation by Turkey under Article 2 (§§ 191-194), we are still in the presence
of an on-going breach of a Convention obligation. The Court should therefore have followed its own case-law on
non-application of the six months rule to continuing situations (§ 159). Non-application of the six months rule to
breaches of international obligations having a continuing character, especially when we deal with such crimes as
enforced disappearance, serves the important purpose of preventing the perpetrators from enjoying impunity for
such acts.
11. However, the non-applicability presumption is a rebuttable one. The Court will in any case examine each
situation, as indeed the Court states in § 165. As noted by the International Court of Justice in the Phosphate
Lands in Nauru Case "It is therefore for the Court to determine in the light of the circumstances of each case
whether the passage of time renders an application inadmissible" (Phosphate Lands in Nauru Case, ICJ Reports,§ 32, 1992). The test for the application of the six months rule to continuing situations is therefore different from
what is set out in the reasoning in § § 166-171. It should be asked instead whether there was any event or act
which could be seen as triggering the running of time for the submission of the complaint, because for as long
as there are no meaningful actions taken to address the problem of disappearances the problem persists, and the
right to complain about it accordingly also persists. In other words, the issue is not whether there is an event
suspending the running of time (see, a contrario, § 171); it is whether there is an event which makes the six
months begin to run. If the CMP was intended to be a proper remedy in the disappearance cases, it indeed could
be properly examined in the light of the six months rule. But this is clearly not the case.
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE VILLIGER
I voted with the majority in finding violations of Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the Convention.
Nevertheless, I disagree with the majority's conclusion in which the Government's preliminary objection as
to the application of the six months' rule under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention is rejected (§ 172 above).
There can be no doubt that the disappearances amounted to a continuing situation. However, the relatives of
the missing persons claiming to suffer from the continuing violation cannot wait indefinitely until they undertake
a particular form of action. At some stage, the continuing situation will come to an end, and the six months' rule
has to be applied. The question arises, when this moment will be.
In the present case, this moment arose when the relatives of the missing persons had remedies at their disposal
and employed them, or failed to employ them as they realised that the remedies were ineffective. The institution
providing for the remedy, if I may call it this, would have been the Committee on Missing Persons (CMP). It
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raised high hopes in 1981 when it was set up. But after a certain time, it could be seen by everyone that it was
not effective, and the relatives could no longer have been expected to apply to it.
Thus, by 1984 delays had become apparent, in particular as it was only then, i.e. three years after the CMP
was set up, that the rules of procedure were prepared. Within a few years thereafter the relatives should have
realised, if necessary assisted by competent legal advice, that the CMP was not at all a body which could afford
relief and which they could be expected to seize.
For me the cut-off date of the continuing period falls in the year 1987. This view, therefore, coincides with
the respondent Government's objection that the six months' rule started running in the year when Turkey accepted
the right of individual application before the former European Human Rights Commission.
As the relatives failed to raise their complaints then, they have not, in my view, complied with the six months'
rule according to Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE ERONEN
A. Following the decision of the Grand Chamber in Silih, the majority in the present case set out to establish
a consistency of jurisprudence in matters relating to ratione temporis and the six months rule in relation to
disappearance cases, granting jurisdiction over the matter to the Court in order to end the anomalies present in
the variety of rulings on the matter to date.
I have been unable to agree with the majority decision that the Court has jurisdiction to decide in the present
case for the reasons I will expound on below and because I found no reason to change my views on the matter
which I gave in the Chamber's judgment. On the whole I have found that, rather than clarifying the situation and
the case-law on the subject as I believe was intended, the case-law precedents on the issue have become even
more untenable and confusing as a result of the majority decision in this case, so that there is now a jurisprudence
which is relatively prejudicial to the efficacy and consistency expected of the European Court of Human Rights.
This I found to be so in both the majority's assessment of ratione temporis in disappearance cases and to the
application of the six months rule, both of which I feel have been eroded and dispensed with as a result of this
decision. I will devote my opinion to these two aspects of the decision and to related issues. Since I do not agree
that the Court has jurisdiction in this case I do not consider it ethical or correct to voice any opinion on any of
the substantive issues involved in the alleged violations of the Convention.
B. I voted against the finding of the majority rejecting the respondent Government's two preliminary objections
that the Court did not have jurisdiction ratione temporis to entertain the case and that the application had been
filed out of time under the six months rule. It is my view that the Court does not have competence to adjudicate
on the merits of the present case. I shall expand further on this opinion below. I also voted against the majority
judgment to the effect that a legal interest remains in pursuing the examination of these applications for the very
reason that the majority in this judgment (paras. 185, 186, 201, 202 and 208) have concluded that the first-named
applicants in each application were amongst those who went missing in 1974. I do not feel it necessary to go into
further detail on the lack of legal interest issue in consideration of the fact that I do not find that the Court has
jurisdiction to entertain the case in view of the other two preliminary objections.
C. In conformity with my opinion that the Court does not have temporal jurisdiction, I voted against the
finding that there has been a continuing violation of Article 2 on account of the failure of the authorities of the
respondent State to conduct effective investigations into the fate of the nine missing men, who disappeared in
life-threatening circumstances. As a result, I again do not feel it correct or ethical to express any comments on
the merits of these allegations or on the majority view stated in the judgment.
D. It follows therefore that for the very same reason I did not consider it in accordance with my opinion on
the lack of competence ratione temporis and the six months rule to commit myself to voicing any views on or
making findings of a continuing violation under Article 3 in respect of the applicants, and of a continuing violation
of Article 5, by virtue of the failure of the authorities of the respondent State to conduct an effective investigation
into the fate of Eleftherios Thoma and Savvas Hadjipanteli.
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E. I voted with my colleagues with regard to the alleged violation of Article 5, to the effect that there has
been no continuing violation by virtue of the failure of the authorities of the respondent State to conduct an
effective investigation into the fate of the seven missing men, for the sake of consistency. I do not deem this to
contradict in any way my opinion on the preliminary objections.
F. Similarly, the reason I voted with my colleagues (despite my opinion that the Court does not have temporal
jurisdiction to deal with the merits of this application) in finding that it was not necessary to examine the complaints
relating to alleged violations under Articles 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 13 and 14 of the Convention, was simply because the
Court found no reason to adjudicate on the complaints and not because I concur with the majority findings of
violations under Articles 2, 3 and 5 (para. 211).
G. For the same reason, in view of my opinion that the Court does not have temporal jurisdiction and since
I do not find that there is a continuing obligation, I voted against any conclusion relating to the question whether
an award should be made in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
H. I voted with my colleagues with regard to the remainder of the applicants' claim for just satisfaction, with
the same motive and belief as stated in (E) above.
At this stage, I would reiterate the observations I made in the case before the Chamber. Any view I may
express in this opinion is made with a view to expanding on and confirming the observations I made at that stage
of the proceedings. The Grand Chamber decision in Silih has not altered my views. I will also express my humble
views on why I could not agree with the majority views in this particular case.
The majority accepts that under general principles applied to this case it does not have competence to examine
factual events in 1974, considering them outside the Court's temporal jurisdiction.
However the majority view notes (a) that the duty to provide an effective investigation is itself an independent
violation operating separately from the substantive limb of Article 2; (b) that even if a presumption of death could
be found, this would not remove the procedural obligation to investigate; (c) that disappearances are an "instanta-
neous act" which nevertheless gives rise to a continuing obligation to investigate, and that the Court therefore
has jurisdiction to try the case ratione temporis.
While deciding on the ratione temporis principle I found some confusion in the assessment of the two recent
cases on ratione temporis, Bleli6 and Silih.
As noted by the majority, the principles in Bleli6 state, inter alia, (in para. 77) that
"... the Court's temporal jurisdiction is to be determined in relation to the facts constitutive of
the alleged interference. The subsequent failure of remedies aimed at redressing that interference
cannot bring it within the Court's temporal jurisdiction." (emphasis added).
The Court, further clarifying the principle in the Bleli6 judgment, emphasised as follows:
"81. In conclusion, while it is true that from the ratification date onwards all of the State's acts
and omissions must conform to the Convention (see Yafca and Sargin v. Turkey, judgment of 8
June 1995, Series A no. 319-A, p. 16, § 40), the Convention imposes no specific obligation on
the Contracting States to provide redress for wrongs or damage caused prior to that date (see
Kopeck v. Slovakia [GC], no. 44912/98, § 38, ECHR 2004-IX). Any other approach would
undermine both the principle of non-retroactivity in the law of treaties and the fundamental
distinction between violation and reparation that underlies the law of State responsibility.
82. In order to establish the Court's temporal jurisdiction it is therefore essential to identify, in
each specific case, the exact time of the alleged interference. In doing so the Court must take into
account both the facts of which the applicant complains and the scope of the Convention right
alleged to have been violated."
In Silih the approach on whether a procedural obligation under Article 2 exists involved the a question of the
detachability of the procedural obligation. Following Silih, for there to be a procedural duty existing under Article 2,
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a) "where death occurred before the critical date, only procedural acts and/or omissions occurring
after that date can fall within the Court's temporal jurisdiction."
b) "there must exist a genuine connection between the death and the entry into force of the
Convention in respect of the respondent State for the procedural obligations imposed by Article
2 to come into effect".
"Thus a significant proportion of the procedural steps required by this provision - which include
not only an effective investigation into the death of the person concerned but also the institution
of appropriate proceedings for the purpose of determining the cause of the death and holding those
responsible to account (see [Vo v. France], § 89) - will have been or ought to have been carried
out after the critical date.
However, the Court would not exclude that in certain circumstances the connection could also be
based on the need to ensure that the guarantees and the underlying values of the Convention are
protected in a real and effective manner" (Silih, paras. 162-163).
While it is true that Turkey ratified the Convention in May 1954, it only recognised the right of individual
petition regarding events occurring after 22 January 1987 and the Court's jurisdiction only in 1990. In order for
Silih to apply, it is also not established in the majority's decision what the "genuine connection between the death
and entry into force of the Convention" is for Turkey.
In my respectful opinion, while Turkey could be bound by the Convention from 1954, the Court does not
have the competence to examine any facts that occurred prior to 1987 even where the procedural obligation under
Article 2 is "detachable", since according to Silih (see above) such jurisdiction to examine did not arise from
any kind of procedural acts and/or omissions occurring after the "critical date" of 1987, which the majority
has already accepted as being the operative date. Article 6 of Protocol 11 confirms this view. In other words the
Court only has jurisdiction to examine a continuing procedural obligation occurring after 1987, since the continuing
obligation would move forward after the critical date, not backwards. Article 6 of Protocol 11 did not change
Turkey's restrictions regarding acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction over any of its acts or omissions
before 1987.
Protocol 11 entered into force on 1 November 1998. Article 6 of Protocol 11 provides:
"Where a High Contracting Party has made a declaration recognising the competence of the
Commission or the jurisdiction of the Court under former Article 25 or 46 of the Convention with
respect to matters arising after or based on facts occurring subsequent to any such declaration,
this limitation shall remain valid for the jurisdiction of the Court under this Protocol."
Article 6 of Protocol 11 in effect clearly states that the present-day Court is only competent to examine
"matters arising after or based on facts occurring subsequent to" any declaration recognising the competence of
the Court. Hence, in line with my views on the ratione temporis question, Article 6 of Protocol 11 clearly prohibits
the Court from entertaining any case which relates to any facts occurring prior to the "critical date" of 1987.
In this respect I found the majority judgment confusing in that despite Article 6 of Protocol 11 binding Turkey
in respect of violations occurring after 1987, the majority prefers to take 1954 as the operative date for its temporal
competence to examine the alleged violations when in fact Turkey did not agree to be compulsorily bound by
them or be accountable for them until the critical date of 1987. In effect, the majority accepts that while the Court
does not have jurisdiction to examine complaints raised in so far as the alleged violations are based on facts having
occurred before that "critical date" (paras. 133-134), that is before 1987, it nonetheless proceeds from its finding
that Turkey was bound by the provisions of the Convention from its date of ratification of the Convention, 18
May 1954. As a result, I find that it mistakenly brings the events of 1974 and the disappearances and subsequent
deaths during that time within its jurisdiction.
This is hard to reconcile with the Xenides-Arestis case, as regards ratione temporis, where the Court, in
assessing compensation in its judgment on just satisfaction, took the operative date as the date when Turkey
recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in 1990, ruling as follows (para. 38):
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"The Court will therefore proceed to determine the compensation the applicant is entitled to in
respect of losses emanating from the denial of access and loss of control, use, and enjoyment of her
property between 22 January 1990, the date of Turkey's acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of
the Court, and the present time (Loizidou (Article 50), judgment of 29 July 1998, cited above, p.
1817, § 31)."
In my view, the majority judgment adds even more confusion to already complex ratione temporis issues as
my comments below will further elaborate.
Presumption of death
My views in relation to this aspect remain the same as in the Chamber judgment, in that:
"... I perceive no justifiable reason why a presumption of death (in the light of the most recent
development in the Court's case-law), unless for reasons of sensitivity on the issue, could not
have been adjudicated and acted upon accordingly. The Bleji6 principle as applied to the present
case, relieves, to a certain extent, the findings on the presumption of being alive and continuing
violation as expressed in the Cyprus v. Turkey decision on missing persons, thereby excluding the
presence of an obligation of a continuing nature. I find that the disappearances and the presumption
of the applicants' being dead existed as a fact before Turkey recognised the right of individual
application to the Commission. That is to say, the facts constitutive of the alleged interference,
and as proven, had taken place before ratification and therefore this Court is not competent ratione
temporis to examine the effective investigation issue or any other issues pertinent to the actual
merits of this case.
In short, I feel that there is no violation of a "continuing nature", and hence no obligation of a
continuing nature. The findings of the Cyprus v. Turkey judgment with regard to a "continuing
violation of Article 2 on account of the failure of the authorities of the respondent State to conduct
an effective investigation" need to be interpreted in line with recent case-law, which necessitates
that such a "continuing obligation" and all consequent requirements of such an obligation, if an
obligation does exist, only exist if the case falls within the competence of this Court ratione
temporis - and, in my view, the present case does not.
Given that the facts constitutive of the alleged interference (disappearance and subsequent presumed
deaths) occurred before 28 January 1987, I do not feel that the Court can examine the complaints
concerning the ineffectiveness of the investigation into the disappearance of the Greek Cypriots,
for lack of jurisdiction ratione temporis."
It is not clear whether the majority decision in the present case is presuming the death of the missing persons
or not, though it does appear to make obscure assumptions on this issue. Further while the presumption of death
is "not automatic" the majority notes that there is a possibility that the missing are dead and it also does this
through examples of case-law where such presumptions of death were actually made (para. 143), "even if there
was an evidential basis which might justify finding that the nine missing men died in or closely after the events
in 1974" (para. 144).
In para. 146 of the majority decision the Court therefore concludes
"that even though a lapse of over 34 years without any news of the missing persons may provide
strong circumstantial evidence that they have died meanwhile, this does not remove the procedural
obligation to investigate."
There appears to be a contradiction when, having made a finding based on "strong circumstantial evidence"
that the men may in fact be dead, the Court states in para. 148:
"A disappearance is a distinct phenomenon, characterised by an ongoing situation of uncertainty
and unaccountability in which there is a lack of information or even a deliberate concealment and
obfuscation of what has occurred."
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I agree with the majority findings in the present case in para. 146 and with para. 147 to the effect that
"as found in Silih v. Slovenia concerning the procedural obligation under Article 2 to investigate
unlawful or suspicious deaths, the procedural obligation under Article 2 arising from disappearances
operates independently of the substantive obligation".
Yet, while it is sought to distinguish the approach of Silih - to the effect that the requirement of proximity
of the death and investigative steps to the date of entry into force of the Convention - "applies only in the context
of killings or suspicious deaths, where the anchoring factual element, the loss of life of the victim, is known for
a certainty, even if the exact cause or ultimate responsibility is not" from the continuing nature of the procedural
obligation as found in the phenomenon of disappearance cases (paras. 148-149), the majority have nonetheless
implicitly accepted that the men are more than likely dead. I consider that the majority in presenting their views
should have arrived at and expounded a more concrete and explicit finding on the fate of the "missing" rather
than simply implicitly doing so.
Bearing the principles set out in Silih in mind, even if the distinct procedural obligation, "operating independently
from the substantive limb", is of a continuing nature, it is related to the facts occurring prior to the critical date
and such an obligation cannot be "detached" from the events which occurred prior to it. Conversely, even if
detachable, the obligation is a part of events occurring before the critical date, and is therefore not within the
Court's temporal jurisdiction.
Therefore, I feel that the observations found in paras. 147 to 149 in effect eliminate the reliance placed by
the majority on Silih and Blelid when arriving at its conclusions.
In line with my views that a presumption of death should be made, I also agree therefore with the majority
that there is "strong circumstantial evidence that they have died" and that this itself does not prevent a procedural
obligation from arising. However, where I differ is that this duty's existence depends on whether the Court does
have temporal jurisdiction regarding the procedural obligation in the first place, which in line with the principles
set down in the recent Grand Chamber judgment of Silih, it does not.
I also concur whole-heartedly with the reasoning of Judges Bratza and Tiirmen in the Silih case, looking
beyond the "detachable" obligations of Article 2's procedural aspect:
"Divorcing the procedural obligation from the death which gave rise to it in this manner would,
in our view, be tantamount to giving retroactive effect to the Convention and rendering nugatory
the State's declaration recognising the Court's competence to receive individual applications."
Even if noted (in para. 134) that
"the applicants specified that their claims related only to the situation pertaining after January
1987, namely the continuing failure to account for the fate and whereabouts of the missing men
by providing an effective investigation",
in the present case the obligation to carry out investigative measure was not triggered by "relevant new
evidence or information" before this Court, since the majority position on this issue is, as I see it, still based on
the 4th inter-State case findings.
Again, to reiterate, I hold the belief that, following the reasoning in Silih, if a duty existed it also existed
before January 1987. This being so, and since the duty to investigate existed long before the date of recognition
of the jurisdiction of both the Commission and the Court (at least 13 years), then according to Article 6 of Protocol
11 the obligation to investigate said to exist cannot be detached from the events prior to 1987. Even where such
an obligation is accepted as "detachable", it is still outside this Court's temporal jurisdiction.
If the duty to investigate existed, it existed from 1974 and continued until and after the critical date. TheSilih
conditions are therefore not satisfied. It is equally true that such facts are not separate or "detachable" from the
events that occurred prior to 1987. Hence, in both respects, the. Court has no jurisdiction to try this case.
This is what the principle of legal certainty requires. Difficulties and anomalies existing behind the judicial
reasoning (paras. 132-150) found in the present applications, result in what I consider to be an effort to bring the
procedural obligation of an investigation within the jurisdiction of this Court.
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I could not help but ask myself the question whether one is to assume therefore that disappearance cases like
the case before us, where a presumption of death is a natural consequence of the facts before the Court, do not
have a place within or are excluded from the fundamental principle of the Convention found in the ratione temporis
rule. Another question: does the finding of the majority in paragraphs 147-149 mean that the ratione temporis
principle is no longer applicable to disappearance cases?
The ratione temporis principle is, as is the procedural aspect of Article 2, enshrined in the Convention. It is
not one that can be overridden and the findings of the majority again leave the Court open to inconsistency in
jurisprudence. This judgment raises serious issues of legal certainty and creates further uncertainties, if the Court's
temporal jurisdiction concerning compliance with the procedural obligation of Article 2 in respect of deaths that
occurred before the critical date were to be regarded as open-ended. As such, these inconsistencies will not be
easily remedied if, in an effort to resolve the differences between various Court decisions on this issue as concerns
the Court's jurisdiction ratione temporis over procedural complaints under Article 2, one does not remain true to
the principles and aspects of "detachability" enunciated in Silih (paras. 153-163, and especially paras. 161-165).
That means, in conclusion, that the majority approach in the present case is, in my opinion "tantamount to
giving retroactive effect to the Convention and rendering nugatory the State's declaration recognising the Court's
competence to receive individual applications" (see the separate opinion of Judges Bratza and Tiirmen in Silih).
In view of the above and Article 6 of Protocol 11, I find that the alleged interference referred to in this case
whether procedural or substantive, does not fall within the Court's temporal jurisdiction and that it is therefore
not competent to examine these applications.
The six months rule
As regards whether there was a "procedural obligation to investigate the fate and whereabouts of the missing
men at the time of the introduction of these applications" the majority concurs with the Chamber judgment that
there was no "unreasonable delay by these applicants in introducing their complaints".
In my view, here too in reality the six months rule becomes eroded by bringing to the rule a different
interpretation from the one which is already clear-cut. While I accept the majority's interpretation of "reasonable
expedition" this is entirely a relative issue pertaining to the present case and has no bearing on the Baybora
applications. While accepting that there were difficulties for the applicants in realising the ineffectiveness of the
CMP, the Court appears to disregard the possibly even more serious difficulties and "special circumstances"
occurring during the intervening years for the Turkish Cypriot applicants on account of "the uncertainty and
confusion which frequently mark the aftermath of a disappearance" (paras. 162-166). No allowances appear to
have been made for Turkish Cypriot "disappearance cases where there is a state of ignorance and uncertainty
and, by definition a failure to account for what has happened, if not an appearance of deliberate concealment
and obstruction on the part of some authorities, [and where] the situation is less clear-cut".
Whereas a date is given - "the end of 1990" - when the applicants were bound to know that the CMP was
ineffective, the majority fail, with all due respect to my colleagues, to give the same understanding to Turkish
Cypriot applicants, who in fact waited for an official confirmation through the Court judgment, that is the judgment
of 10 May 2001 in the 4th inter-State case. Here I find it necessary to reiterate my opinion in the Chamber
judgment on this issue:
"(a) The intervening Government of Cyprus recognised the right to individual petition to the
Commission on 1 January 1989. The Turkish Cypriot applicants could not have applied earlier
for redress in respect of their claims. Similarly Greek Cypriot applicants could not have applied,
until Turkey's ratification in 1987, to the Commission and, in January 1990, to the Court.
(b) The applicants in the present case, as well as those in the Karabardak and Others case, could
not have known of the decisions taken in the inter-State cases. The first, second or third inter-
State cases did not really deal with the issues of continuing violation. It was in 2001, in the fourth
inter-State case, that the notion of continuing violation in disappearance cases was first expounded.
In any event, no applicant could have applied until 1989 or 1990, respectively. The present
applicants lodged their application in 1990. The Karabardak applicants made their application in
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2001, probably after obtaining legal advice on the issue. The legal positions, in both cases, are
the same.
(c) As pointed out in the Akdivar case (Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, judgment of 16 September
1996, Reports 1996-IV, p. 1210) prevailing "special circumstances" need to be taken into account
when considering whether remedies are actually available. Considering the climate in Cyprus in
both 1963-4 and 1974, one cannot say with certainty that such redress was readily available to
trace the disappearances (see also Cyprus v. Turkey, § 99).
(d) The CMP did not start functioning until 1981. The CMP was concerned with collecting files
on both Greek and Turkish missing persons' families, so reliance was probably placed on the
outcome of the CMP investigations and no other redress claimed. Understandably, such families
of missing persons were not aware of the mandate of the CMP as it stood at the time and perhaps
only became aware of its functions and views on its work following the fourth inter-State judgment
in May 2001. It follows then that the fact that the applicants in the present case applied to the
Commission three days after Turkey recognised the Court's jurisdiction is, with all due respect
to my colleagues, immaterial. Legally there is no difference between the delays of the Karabardak
applicants and the present applicants in their applications to the Court and the Commission,
respectively. If the Karabardak and Baybora applications were rejected for being introduced out
of time under Article 35, so too should the present applications have been. The fact that the events
they complained of took place during the inter-communal strife of the 1960s and not in 1974
makes no difference to the legal situation."
While the majority claim to have given "careful consideration" to the families of the Turkish Cypriots missing
in intercommunal strife in the 1960s, stating, in para. 171:
"[The Court] is particularly sensitive to any appearance that differing, and inconsistent, approaches
have been taken in these cases. Nonetheless, it is not persuaded that this is so. The Chamber
decisions in the aforementioned cases are very concise; and in the absence of arguments from the
parties, there is no explanatory reasoning. Their conclusion, however, that the applications were
introduced out of time is in line with the principles and case-law outlined above",
I do not have the impression that this is so. I consider that there is a clear contradiction in adding that the
conclusion "is in line with the principles and case-law". Either there is no "explanatory reasoning" or the
"conclusion is in line with the principles and case-law". It cannot be both since the Baybora decisions are described
as "concise". In effect, therefore, the majority's assessment here of the Baybora case (para. 171) sadly closes
the door on Turkish Cypriot applications.
For the sake of clarity and conformity of case-law, the date of the 4th inter-State judgment of this Court, when
the CMP's ineffectiveness was actually discussed and addressed, would have been the more appropriate date, not
"the end of 1990".
The six months rule is a principle of law, a legal fact, and to be abided by whether 3 years or 13 years have
passed. It makes no difference. If there is "undue delay" in 3 years, then there is also "undue delay" in 13 years.
The reasoning given by the majority to justify both the present application and the Baybora rulings is in my
opinion not in conformity with Silih, since as was found in Baybora, so too the present applications should have
been lodged within the six months period. Or, taken vice versa, a decision should have been given in Baybora in
conformity with the present views.
As stated above, the Silih judgment (para. 165) attaches importance (a) to the fact that the events giving rise
to the procedural obligation had occurred a short time before the critical date of ratification and (b) to the fact
that the investigations had begun after ratification. In this respect, in Silih the Court notes that the death of the
applicants' son had occurred "only a little more than a year before the entry into force of the Convention in
respect of Slovenia" and also to the fact that all investigations had begun within a short time after the critical
date. Therefore, since the procedural duty to investigate occurred shortly after ratification by Slovenia, the Court
there found it had jurisdiction. It should be noted that unlike the respondent Government in the present case,
Slovenia had recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Human Rights Commission and the European
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Human Rights Court from the date when it deposited the instrument of ratification of the Convention, that is on
28 June 1994.
For the reasons I have stated, the present applications were not filed in conformity with the six months rule.
Regrettably therefore, I cannot agree with the majority view, and conclude that the judgment on this issue also
creates a serious contradiction in European Convention law and precedents by stating:
"Accordingly, by applying to the Court in January 1990, these applicants acted, in the special
circumstances of their cases, with reasonable expedition for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the
Convention" (para. 170).
Without committing myself to comments on the merits of this case and without prejudice to my above views,
I find it important to make some reference to the views expressed with regard to the CMP and the burden of
proof.
The Committee on Missing Persons (CMP)
In my view, relevant information regarding the functions of the CMP which was not available to the Grand
Chamber in the inter-State case has been presented in these applications. Yet a simple reference (para. 85), perfectly
understandable for establishing exactly what the CMP is and noting its functions, is merely taken from the inter-
State case judgment delivered in 2001 and is insufficient to note the important developments since that date (paras.
86-87). It does an injustice to the large quantity of information provided by the respondent Government since that
judgment was delivered.
Even if the CMP is still considered ineffective to meet the purposes of Article 2, I find it is inconceivable
that there is nothing more to say about it in the light of all the material provided since the 2001 decision. The
majority judgment itself makes no new finding on any aspect of its work. I do not find that the development of
the CMP's functions and its relevance as part of an "effective investigation", even after the receipt of new
information and evidence, have been sufficiently reassessed. This is made more evident by the fact that while the
Court has made extensive use of facts, information and case-law, etc relating to ratione temporis jurisdiction in
disappearance cases before other international bodies especially (paras. 88 to 102), it has not done the same with
regard to the CMP information provided.
My views are supported by the recent important developments which have shown the role and activities of
the CMP as an imperative and indispensable factor towards the implementation of effective investigations as
required by Article 2. This fact was emphasised in a decision taken at the 1051 st DH meeting of the Committee
of Ministers on 19 March 2009 (see para. 88 above).
The Committee of Ministers, supervising the execution of judgment in the 4th inter-State case, noted that the
"sequence of measures within the framework of the effective investigations" necessitated that any other form of
effective investigation should not jeopardise the CMP's mission and considered it crucial that the current work
of the CMP be carried out under the best possible conditions and without further delay. In doing so it especially
underlined the importance of preserving all information obtained during the Programme of Exhumation and
Identification. It noted, in effect, that the CMP's mission is part of and not separate from any other required
investigation and must take precedence over any other "effective investigation". In my understanding, the Commit-
tee of Ministers' decision emphasises that the CMP's work on the missing would need to be completed before
any other kind of additional investigation can be initiated.
The burden of proof
I would like to comment briefly too on the references to the burden of proof in the present applications: The
majority have found that " the Court would concur that the standard of proof generally applicable in individual
applications is that of beyond reasonable doubt - though this also applies equally in inter-State cases" (para 182).
However, I consider that this view fails to give a reasoning as why this is so, resulting in a situation where
any differences between the two degrees of proof are not dealt with, and therefore fails to comment on whether
the burden of proof has been discharged in these particular individual cases.
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In inter-State cases, States do not have to prove grievance or injury. In individual cases however, such issues
have to be proved. Equating individual applications with inter-State applications on the same level is, I feel, an
error in law which has in effect eliminated the standard of proof necessary to establish a violation in individual
applications.
As to the shifting of the burden of proof (para. 184), in individual applications the burden of proof only shifts
to the respondent Government if the applicants have, in the first place, discharged their burden and initially proven
the facts relied upon to establish their claim for redress. This, in my opinion, is not the case in the present
applications. In effect the inter-State case findings have been taken as part and parcel of the proof of these
applications and have been applied without separately examining and making separate findings of fact in these
individual applications.
While stating that "There is no basis on which it can be assumed that the missing men in the present case
were included in the Court's (inter-State case) findings" (para. 181), the judgment then goes on to say:
"In light of the findings in the fourth inter-State case, which have not been controverted, these
disappearances occurred in life-threatening circumstances where the conduct of military operations
was accompanied by widespread arrests and killings. Article 2 therefore imposes a continuing
obligation on the respondent Government to account for the whereabouts and fate of the missing
men in the present case" (para 186).
This is a discrepancy clearly showing that the burden of proof incumbent on the applicants in the present case
has not been assessed, the Court having merely adopted the inter-State case judgment on this issue. In this part
of the majority judgment (paras. 181-186), and especially in para. 185, there is an indirect finding of fact as regards
what occurred in 1974, which the majority have already accepted as being outside its temporal jurisdiction. With
respect, this I sense is due to the fact that while it is sought to establish a "detachable" obligation under the
procedural aspect of Article 2, the judgment nonetheless relies on facts outside of the Court's temporal jurisdiction,
considering them already established as existing, when this is not so.
Damages and costs
On a final note, I have found the respondent Government justified in their preliminary objections and that
this Court lacks jurisdiction, ratione temporis, to entertain this case. Therefore, I do not see any purpose in giving
my opinion as to whether an "impact of the violation..... regarded as being of a nature and degree as to have
impinged so significantly on the moral well-being" of the second applicants can be attributable to acts or omissions
of the respondent Government in violation of the Convention.
Since I do not concur in the findings that the facts of the applications can be a subject for assessment by the
Court, I cannot possibly agree with the majority's assessment under Article 41 on the issue of just satisfaction
claims, whether in whole or in part.
In consideration of all of the above, I find also that there should be no award as to costs since this Court lacks
jurisdiction and the applications are time-barred by the six-month rule.
ENDNOTES
Cypriots at Aleminyo; subsequent identifications were made
1 See paragraph 11. of 22 Greek Cypriots at Kazaphani, Livadhia and Sandallaris,
2 See paragraph 10. and 6 Turkish Cypriots in the Famagusta district. Their nameshave since been removed from the list of missing persons.
3 See paragraph 9. 6 This Convention was opened for signature in February 2007.
4 The document provided by the applicants listed 20 names, It will enter into force "on the thirtieth day after the date of
including that of Savvas Kalli which was the name under deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of
which this applicant had been recorded (see paragraph 80). the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession." Only
5 States have ratified the Convention (Albania, Argentina,
5 The first group of remains identified consisted of 13 Turkish France, Honduras and Mexico).
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7 The last two obligations are not only derived from the Inter-
American Convention, but also from the Inter-American Con-
vention on Forced Disappearance of Persons (2004) and the
Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture
(1985), which may be invoked before the Court pursuant to
Article 29 (d) of the Inter-American Convention.
8 See Sarna v. Sri Lanka, 16 July 2003, § 9.5. See also Edriss
El Hassy v. the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 24 October 2007,§ 6.8.
9 General Comment No. 6 (1982) at § 4.
10 See Bleier v. Uruguay, 29 March 1982, § 14.
11 See Edriss El Hassy v. the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, §7.
12 See Mr. Farag Mohammed ElAlwani v. Libya, 11 July 2006.
The HRC found a violation of Article 2 § 3 in conjunction
with Articles 6, 7 and 9 with regard to the disappeared person
and of Article 2 § 3 in conjunction with Article 7 with regard
to the relative.
13 At § 6.2.
14 At § 11.
15 At § 12.2.
16 See the First Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field (first adopted in 1864, last revision in 1949); Second
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea (first adopted in 1949); Third Geneva Conven-
tion relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (first adopted
in 1929, last revised in 1949); and Fourth Geneva Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
(first adopted in 1949), together with three additional amend-
ment protocols, Protocol I (1977), Protocol 11 (1977) and
Protocol n (2005).
414 [VOL 49:
